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THE CONJUNCTION PROBLEM AND THE LOGIC OF JURY
FINDINGS
DAVID S. SCHWARTZ* & ELLIOTT SOBER**
ABSTRACT
For several decades, evidence theorists have puzzled over the
following paradox, known as the “conjunction paradox” or “con-
junction problem.” Probability theory appears to tell us that the
probability of a conjunctive claim is the product resulting from mul-
tiplying the probabilities of its separate conjuncts. In a three element
negligence case (breach of duty, causation, damages), a plaintiff who
proves each element to a 0.6 probability will have proven her overall
claim to a very low probability of 0.216. Either the plaintiff wins the
verdict based on this low probability (if the jury focuses on elements),
or the plaintiff loses despite having met the condition of proving each
element to the stated threshold. To solve this “conjunction problem,”
evidence theorists have advanced such proposals as changing the
rules of probability, barring probability theory entirely from analysis
of adjudicative fact-finding, abandoning the procedural principle
that the defendant need not present a narrative of innocence or
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nonliability, or dispensing with the requirement that the overall
claim meet an established burden of proof.
This Article argues that the conjunction paradox in fact presents
a theoretical problem of little if any consequence. Dropping the
condition that proving each element is a sufficient, as opposed to
merely a necessary, condition for proof of a claim makes the con-
junction problem disappear. Nothing in logic or probability theory
requires this “each element/sufficiency” condition, and the legal
decision rules reflected in most jury instructions do not mandate it.
Once this “each element/sufficiency” condition is removed, all that
is left of the conjunction problem is a “probability gap,” an intuitive
but ill-founded impression that the mathematical underpinnings of
the conjunction problem are unfair to claimants. This probability
gap is considerably narrowed by recognizing the probabilistic
dependence of most facts internal to a given claim, and by applying
the correct multiplication rule for probabilistically dependent events.
Finally, this Article argues that solving the conjunction problem is
an insufficient ground either to abandon probability theory as a
useful analytical tool in the context of adjudicative fact-finding, or
to reform decision rules for trial fact-finders.
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INTRODUCTION
An important theoretical inquiry that has long engaged evidence
scholars involves the nature of legal fact-finding. Because the
reconstruction of past events in litigation is inherently uncertain,
the legal system adopts decision rules, known as burdens of proof,
to permit fact-finders to reach decisions in the absence of complete
certainty.1 The burdens of proof—“beyond a reasonable doubt” in
criminal cases, “preponderance of the evidence” in most civil cases,
and occasionally “clear and convincing evidence”—express probabil-
ity thresholds that the law says must be reached to sustain a civil
claim or criminal charge.2 Burdens of proof can thus be seen as a
particular application of a broader question that philosophers would
characterize as falling within the subfield of epistemology. This
question is “under what conditions is belief justified?”3 In trials, we
say in effect that belief in the defendant’s guilt or liability is justi-
fied when the burden of proof is met (or vice versa). It is axiomatic
in our legal system that meeting the burden of proof requires
evidence, but a more elusive theoretical question remains: How do
we know when the burden of proof has been met? While as a
practical matter judges and juries almost daily render seemingly
acceptable decisions that the burden of proof in a case before them
has or has not been met, evidence theorists continue to debate the
theoretical underpinnings of this question.
A major point of contention in this evidence scholarship is what
role, if any, probability theory actually plays, or should play, in
telling us when the burden of proof has been met. One recent article
claimed that “[m]ost evidence scholars believe that adjudicative fact-
finding is fundamentally incompatible with mathematical probabil-
ity,” and therefore the latter is not a usable guide to the burden of
1. See Ronald J. Allen & Alex Stein, Evidence, Probability, and the Burden of Proof, 55
ARIZ. L. REV. 557, 558 (2013).
2. See id.
3. See, e.g., ELLIOTT SOBER, EVIDENCE AND EVOLUTION: THE LOGIC BEHIND THE SCIENCE
3-4 (2008); see also Michael S. Pardo & Ronald J. Allen, Juridical Proof and the Best
Explanation, 27 LAW & PHIL. 223, 241 (2008) (“[A] hypothesis or conclusion explains evidence
and the evidence in turn justifies the belief that the hypothesis or conclusion is true.”).
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proof question.4 This skepticism is driven largely by the belief that
“[a]pplication of mathematical probability in the courts of law en-
genders paradoxes and anomalies that are not easy to avoid or
explain away.”5 Judging by the attention paid to it, the most serious
of these paradoxes, posing the greatest challenge to probability
theory, is “the conjunction problem.”6
As framed by evidence scholars, the conjunction problem (also
known as the “conjunction paradox”) goes like this: Suppose a
plaintiff ’s civil case consists of two elements—for example, defen-
dant’s negligence and causation of plaintiff’s damages. The jury will
be instructed that it must find each element to the degree of
probability defining the burden of persuasion in civil cases: more
than 50%, or 0.5 on a probability scale of 0 to 1. The jury may also
be told—and if not, it will simply be a systemic background sup-
position7—that a verdict for the plaintiff can be rendered only if the
plaintiff ’s overall claim meets or exceeds this same probability
threshold.
So here is the problem: In basic probability theory, the “multipli-
cation rule for conjunction” (also known as “the product rule”) holds
that the probability of co-occurrence of two or more events is based
on multiplying the probability of each. If occurrences A and B are
mutually independent, then the probability of both A and B occur-
ring together equals the product of the probabilities of A and B each
4. See Allen & Stein, supra note 1, at 562.
5. Id. at 560.
6. See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen, Factual Ambiguity and a Theory of Evidence, 88 NW. U. L.
REV. 604, 604 (1994) (arguing that the “most damaging” proof paradox tending to undermine
“the conventional [probabilistic] view” of burdens of proof is “the remarkable consequences of
the conjunctive effect implicit in the conventional theory”); Kevin M. Clermont, The Death of
Paradox: The Killer Logic Beneath the Standards of Proof, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1061, 1110
(2013) (proposing reliance on alternative “fuzzy” approach to probability in order to avoid the
conjunction paradox); Michael S. Pardo, Group Agency and Legal Proof; or Why the Jury Is an
“It,” 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1793, 1825 (2015) (asserting that “the probabilistic conception
[of proof] faces a number of conceptual problems” of which “the ‘conjunction paradox’” is “[t]he
most famous (or notorious)”). As Mark Spottswood notes, “The literature on the [conjunction]
paradox is voluminous.” Mark Spottswood, Unraveling the Conjunction Paradox, 15 LAW,
PROBABILITY & RISK 259, 259 n.2, 260 (2016) (citing sources).
7. See Allen & Stein, supra note 1, at 567-69 (describing the natural tendency of jurors
to construct complete narratives of a case); Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive
Theory of Juror Decision Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519, 523-28 (1991)
(describing the active construction of “stories” by jurors as a means of comprehending and
evaluating the evidence presented).
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occurring independently: Pr(A & B) = Pr(A) × Pr(B).8 Now suppose
that the plaintiff proves each element to a 0.6 probability. The
probability that both elements are true is 0.6 × 0.6 = 0.36. If the jury
focuses on the probabilities of “each element” separately without
multiplying them, the plaintiff wins even though the overall
probability of her claim is less than 0.5. If the jury instead focuses
on the overall probability (0.36), the plaintiff loses even though she
has met the burden of persuasion under the jury instruction to
prove “each element” by a preponderance of the evidence (here, 0.6).
Either way, there is an apparently irreconcilable tension between
the two formulations of the burden of proof: one based on proving
each element, and the other based on proving the whole claim.9
The conjunction problem thus depends on the presence of two
assumed conditions about how the law directs fact-finders to decide
claims—specifically, the insistence both that the claimant wins by
proving each element to the probability threshold (the “each ele-
ment” condition), and that the claimant wins by proving her overall
claim to the probability threshold (the “whole claim” condition).10
Notably, these legal decision rules are not themselves compelled by
probability theory.11 But once they are both assumed, probability
theory completes the conjunction paradox by imposing the axiom
that the probabilities of the elements must be multiplied to deter-
mine the probability of the overall claim, which is their conjunc-
tion.12 The further axiom that those probabilities will always be
between 0 and 1 dictates arithmetically that the product of the
8. See IAN HACKING, AN INTRODUCTION TO PROBABILITY AND INDUCTIVE LOGIC 41-42
(2001). When we speak of “events” or “occurrences,” we are simply talking about things to
which probabilities can be assigned. See Alan Hájek, Interpretations of Probability, in STAN-
FORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Winter 2012 ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win
2012/entries/probability-interpret/ [https://perma.cc/Y8R3-8PYW] (“The bearers of probabili-
ties are sometimes also called ‘events’ or ‘outcomes’, but the underlying formalism remains
the same.”). The legal system’s various references to “facts,” “disputed facts,” “elements of
claims,” and other terms likewise imply “bearers of probabilities.” Cf. id.
9. The conjunction problem can also be formulated for criminal cases. Whatever
numerical probability threshold is set for the beyond a reasonable doubt standard—say 0.9
for illustration—the product of a multi-element case with each element proved to 0.9 will
multiply out to less than 0.9 for the whole case.
10. See Edward K. Cheng, Reconceptualizing the Burden of Proof, 122 YALE L.J. 1254,
1256-57, 1257 n.5 (2013).
11. See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
12. See infra Part III.
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probabilities will always be less than or equal to the lowest indi-
vidual probability.13 Putting the “each element” and “whole claim”
conditions together with the probability axioms, some claims will
necessarily fall into a gap between these two conditions: that is,
they will meet the “each element” condition but not the “whole
claim” condition.14 We will call this the “probability gap.” Expositors
of the conjunction problem seem to believe that a lot of claims will
get lost in the probability gap. Hence, the conjunction paradox be-
comes the conjunction problem for conceptualizing the burden of
proof as a predetermined probability threshold (such as 0.5 in civil
cases and 0.9 in criminal cases).
The prevailing view seems to be that the conjunction problem
cannot be solved as a formal matter, and that it instead needs to be
worked around by a high-level theoretical solution.15 The most pop-
ular contemporary workarounds involve changing the rules of prob-
ability, banishing probability theory from the legal arena entirely,
or abandoning the assumption that a claimant must meet a pre-
determined probabilistic threshold for his overall claim.16 Each of
these theoretical fixes creates potential difficulties and costs that
should make us want to be sure that the disease is worse than the
cure.17
In this Article, we argue that the conjunction paradox in fact
presents a theoretical problem of little if any consequence. Dropping
one aspect of the “each element” condition—the assumption that
proving each element is a sufficient, as opposed to merely a nec-
essary, condition for proof of a claim—makes the conjunction prob-
lem inconsequential. In a very brief symposium essay written over
thirty years ago, Professor Dale Nance made this observation, and
pointed out that nothing in logic or probability theory requires this
assumption.18 He observed further that its foundation in the rules
13. See Hájek, supra note 8.
14. See infra Part III.
15. See Ronald J. Allen & Sarah A. Jehl, Burdens of Persuasion in Civil Cases: Algorithms
v. Explanations, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 893, 894-95, 897, 929 (“We suspect nobody can explain
the [conjunction paradox] formally.”); Allen & Stein, supra note 1, at 563 (“Evidence scholars,
including us, have tried to resolve this paradox or somehow explain it away.”).
16. See infra Part II.
17. See infra Part II.D.
18. See Dale A. Nance, A Comment on the Supposed Paradoxes of a Mathematical
Interpretation of the Logic of Trials, 66 B.U. L. REV. 947, 950 (1986).
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of adjudication is ambiguous at best.19 Unfortunately, Nance’s
argument has received relatively little attention, and has not been
developed at length.20 This Article takes up where Nance left off. We
show that most jurisdictions treat proof of the elements in their jury
instructions as merely a necessary (not a sufficient) condition for
sustaining a claim, although the practice of using special verdicts in
civil cases introduces a measure of ambiguity about this.21
With the removal of the condition that proving each element is
sufficient for the plaintiff to win, all that is left of the conjunction
problem is the above-described “probability gap.” In this Article, we
also show that the probability gap (again, as a theoretical matter)
has been exaggerated by expositors of the conjunction problem, who
have mistakenly presented the problem as if all or most elements of
claims are probabilistically independent.22 By recognizing the proba-
bilistic dependence of most facts internal to a given claim and
applying the correct multiplication rule for probabilistically depen-
dent events, the probability gap may be considerably narrowed.23 In
any event, the probability gap presents a problem of perception. The
intuitive belief that too many cases fall into the probability gap is
not a logical problem nor a reason to abandon probability theory as
19. See id. at 950-52.
20. Nance has repeated the argument on a couple of occasions, in a succinct length similar
to his original formulation. See DALE A. NANCE, THE BURDENS OF PROOF 74-78 (2016) (describ-
ing his analysis of the conjunction paradox as a “digression”); Dale A. Nance, Naturalized
Epistemology and the Critique of Evidence Theory, 87 VA. L. REV. 1551, 1572-74, 1592 (2001);
see also Richard D. Friedman, Infinite Strands, Infinitesimally Thin: Storytelling, Bayesian-
ism, Hearsay and Other Evidence, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 79, 97-99 (1992) (suggesting that the
conjunction problem disappears if elements are considered after the probability of the whole
claim, and that considering elements separately is “a helpful shortcut in reaching a verdict
against the claim”); David Hamer, The Civil Standard of Proof Uncertainty: Probability, Belief
and Justice, 16 SYDNEY L. REV. 506, 527 (1994) (“[A] consideration of the actual process of
proof reveals the conjunction problem to be something of an illusion. In practice the
mathematical standard will require the plaintiff to construct a story, with probability level
of greater than 50 per cent, which includes each of the required elements.”).
Ronald Allen and Sarah Jehl claim to have refuted Nance by purporting to show that most
jury instructions unambiguously reproduce the conjunction paradox. See Allen & Jehl, supra
note 15, at 898 n.17, 922-29. Nance has responded, correctly in our view, that Allen and Jehl
misinterpreted most of the instructions they discussed. NANCE, supra, at 76 & n.200. In Part
IV we show that the majority of jurisdictions do not clearly reproduce the conjunction problem
in their jury instructions, though they may do so in their special verdict forms.
21. See infra Part IV.C.
22. See infra Part III.B.
23. See infra Parts III.C-D.
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a useful analytical tool in the context of adjudicative fact-finding.
Moreover, as we show in Part IV, using the multiplication rule for
dependent events helps to illustrate the actual function of the “each
element” jury instructions that have so bedeviled commentators on
the conjunction problem.
The theoretical inquiry into whether and to what extent probabil-
ity theory usefully applies to our understanding of litigation fact-
finding is an important one. But the conjunction problem is merely
a distraction from the real merits of that conversation. Much evi-
dence scholarship “has been driven by efforts to domesticate” the
various “proof paradoxes” arising out probability theory.24 Because
the conjunction problem is the most salient of these proof paradoxes,
it has had an outsized influence in this debate, perhaps without con-
tributing a great deal to its advancement.25 Whatever the strengths
and limitations of using probability theory to explain trial decision-
making, the perceived need to solve the conjunction problem should
not be a factor in the debate.
To be sure, there may be practical problems arising out of contra-
dictory probabilistic approaches to jury instructions. These, how-
ever, are empirical and policy questions. We conclude by arguing
that evidence theorists should hesitate before proposing to reform
the decision rules for juries in order to “solve” the conjunction prob-
lem.26 Until empirical research has demonstrated that juries are
confused, or that they reach systematically “wrong” results, we see
no basis to treat the conjunction paradox as a problem that needs to
be solved through theory-driven legal reform.
24. Allen & Jehl, supra note 15, at 894-95; see infra Part II.
25. We do not claim to address other “proof paradoxes,” at least some of which may have
more relevance to epistemological questions in evidence. For example, the “Blue Bus” paradox
directly raises the question of whether a thinly evidenced probability is sufficient to justify
belief. See Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process,
84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1340-41 (1971). Ronald Allen and Michael Pardo have shown that the
Blue Bus problem is an example of a deeper problem: that the reliability of purely statistical
evidence is dependent on often-indeterminate questions about the proper reference class. See
Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Problematic Value of Mathematical Models of
Evidence, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 107, 109-10, 113-14, 137 (2007).
26. See infra Part IV.D.
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I. WHY DOES THE CONJUNCTION PARADOX RAISE A PROBLEM?
The fact that jury trials continue to muddle along despite the
seemingly unsolved conjunction paradox suggests that it may not
create a problem of great practical import. We are aware of no em-
pirical studies suggesting that fact-finders award verdicts to unde-
serving claimants whose claims multiply out to a product less than
0.5 or 0.9, but who meet the burden of proof for the separate
elements.27 Cases of juries actually engaging in such a multiplica-
tion exercise, or being instructed to, are virtually unheard of.
Even if fact-finders applied the multiplication rule, it is unclear
whether it would work systematically to the disadvantage of
plaintiffs or defendants, because the conjunction problem can be
framed to disadvantage either side. No clear consensus exists
among evidence commentators whether a plaintiff who proves each
of three elements to a 0.6 probability should win, because he has
proven each element by a preponderance, or lose, because his claim
as a whole has merely a 0.216 probability.28 And prosecutors should
stand at the greatest disadvantage, since the product rule would
pose the greatest difficulties for reaching the “beyond a reasonable
doubt” threshold, which is typically quantified as high as 0.9 or
0.95.29 Yet we are aware of no serious empirical argument that
prosecutors are unduly hampered in obtaining convictions or that
the conjunction problem produces a slew of unwarranted criminal
acquittals.30 One might think that the failure of the conjunction
27. Complicated jury instructions or special verdict forms may tend to work against
plaintiffs by confusing juries with undue complexity. See Elizabeth G. Thornburg, The Power
and the Process: Instructions and the Civil Jury, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1837, 1886 (1998) (“The
complexity of the special verdict also works against the party with the burden of proof and the
party seeking to change the status quo, usually the plaintiff.”). This is a different problem
from application of the product rule.
28. Compare, e.g., Clermont, supra note 6, at 1108 (plaintiff should lose), and Spottswood,
supra note 6, at 260 (same), with Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial
Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1389-90 (1985) (plaintiff should
win). See generally Allen & Jehl, supra note 15, at 933 n.152 (noting this ambiguity created
by the conjunction paradox).
29. Cheng, supra note 10, at 1256 (citing Brown v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 342, 345-46 (7th Cir.
1988)).
30. About 85% of criminal trials end in guilty verdicts in the United States. Eric
Rasmusen et al., Convictions Versus Conviction Rates: The Prosecutor’s Choice, 11 AM. L. &
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problem to materialize in the form of real-world consequences would
suggest to scholars that there is a conceptual flaw in the way the
problem is constructed.
Perhaps a theoretical problem with no real-world consequences
can be safely ignored. On the other hand, as one leading scholar
puts it, “the conjunction paradox will unavoidably pose at least some
practical difficulties”—perhaps encouraging undue judicial reliance
on element-by-element special verdict forms that impede holistic
jury decision-making.31 The paradox “therefore remains troubling,
and theorists twist themselves into pretzels trying to explain it
away.”32 Moreover, the mistaken belief in a real-world conjunction
problem reflects some persistent misunderstandings about the
nature of adjudicative facts, the role of essential elements in a cause
of action, and the extent to which the law already embraces intu-
itive and natural reasoning processes without the need for mucking
about by theorists. Given the huge impact that evidence scholars
have long had on the development of evidence law,33 it is always
worth the trouble to carefully examine whether an apparent prob-
lem is a real one, lest proposed theoretical fixes coalesce into ill-
advised reforms.
What creates the conjunction paradox? It is based on a model of
decision-making that makes the following assumptions regarding
legal claims, all of which are broken down by the substantive law
into two or more “elements”:
1. The elements of any legal claim are viewed by logic and
probability theory as conjoint events.
ECON. REV. 47, 50 (2009). Some reviewers of drafts of this Article have argued that this high
conviction rate at trial reflects a selection effect, in that prosecutors settle out their weaker
cases and try their stronger ones, which would predict a higher win rate. This argument is
almost certainly exaggerated and probably wrong. First, cases go to trial when settlement
negotiations break down over probability and risk assessment divergences between the
parties. Second, it is at least as likely that defendants take their stronger cases to trial. Third,
if there were selection effects based on claimant case strength, those would operate in civil
cases too, and would thus not explain the higher claimant win rates in criminal cases. In any
event, the high conviction rate does not suggest a conjunction problem for prosecutors.
31. Clermont, supra note 6, at 1110.
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., Eleanor Swift, One Hundred Years of Evidence Law Reform: Thayer’s
Triumph, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2437 (2000) (describing the tremendous influence of Edmund
Morgan and other evidence scholars on the development of the Federal Rules of Evidence).
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2. The decision maker will assign each element of the claim a
probability between zero and one based on the evidence in the
case.
3. The overall probability of the claim is the product of the
probabilities of the separate elements. This product will always
be less than or equal to the lowest separate probability.
4. The “each element” condition: A necessary and sufficient
condition for the claimant (plaintiff or prosecutor) to win the
claim is that the probability of each separate element exceeds
the probability threshold established by the applicable burden
of proof.
5. The “whole claim” condition: If the probability of the overall
claim is greater than the probability threshold established by
the applicable burden of proof, the claimant should win the
claim; if not, she should lose.
The source of the conjunction problem is easy to identify.
Assumptions 1 through 3 apply axioms of probability theory to basic
suppositions of the legal system, and need not be controversial.
Assumption 5 also seems to be an uncontroversial assumption of the
legal system. The conjunction problem arises from assumption 4,
and more specifically, from the two italicized words, “and sufficient.”
If those two words were omitted, assumption 4 would simply state
an arithmetical corollary of assumptions 3 and 5.
In other words, the conjunction paradox arises out of the assump-
tion that proving each element to a probability above the burden of
proof threshold is a sufficient condition to find the defendant liable
or guilty. Drop this assumption, and the problem goes away.34 To be
sure, for the problem to go away, the separate probabilities of the
conjuncts would have to exceed the threshold—by quite a lot where
there are several elements—in order to multiply out to a product
above the threshold. So there will be cases where the claimant loses
34. See Nance, supra note 18, at 950 (arguing that the “each element” condition is neces-
sary but not sufficient for a jury finding); see also NANCE, supra note 20, at 74-76 (noting how
ambiguities in jury instructions can give rise to the conjunction paradox).
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even though she proves each element to the threshold. But there
will be no cases where the claimant wins without proving each
element to the threshold. That is, the “each element” condition is
necessary, but not sufficient, for the claimant to win.
It should be noted that the conjunction paradox is not a problem
with probability theory, or even with the application of probability
theory to legal reasoning. Rather, the problem arises from the ap-
parent insistence on two decision rules that are conventions of the
legal system: that a claimant wins if the probability of each conjunct
element exceeds 0.5, but loses if the probability of the conjunction
(her claim as a whole) is less than or equal to 0.5. Nothing in
probability theory or logic compels this combination of decision
rules. The sometime insistence of evidence theorists that the con-
junction problem is a powerful indication that probability theory
must be set aside as a description of legal reasoning therefore seems
misplaced.35 
For ease of reference, let’s break assumption 4, the “each element”
condition, into two parts:
4a. Proving that the probability of each separate element ex-
ceeds the probability threshold established by the applicable
burden of proof is a necessary condition for the claimant to win
the claim.
4b. Proving that the probability of each separate element ex-
ceeds the probability threshold established by the applicable
burden of proof is a sufficient condition for the claimant to win
the claim.
To be clear, we are using the term “sufficient condition” in its
philosophic logic sense: a sufficient condition for a state of affairs X
is one that, if satisfied, guarantees that X is true.36 The conjunction
35. As Richard Friedman trenchantly put it, “I do not believe that any considered body
of law precludes implementation of [the whole claim condition], and if there were the
Bayesian approach would show that the law was wrong, not the other way around.” Richard
D. Friedman, Answering the Bayesioskeptical Challenge, 1 INT’L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 276,
280 (1997).
36. “‘X is a sufficient condition for Y ’ means that if X is true, so is Y. That is, for Y to be
true, it’s sufficient for X to be true.” ELLIOTT SOBER, CORE QUESTIONS IN PHILOSOPHY 387 (6th
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paradox assumes that if the claimant proves that each separate
element exceeds the probability threshold, her claim is necessarily
“true” for legal purposes—she necessarily wins her case. That is,
a jury finding that each separate element exceeds the probability
threshold is equivalent to a finding in favor of the claimant. Thus,
“sufficient condition” is not to be confused with the phrase “suffi-
cient evidence” as used in the law of procedure and evidence, which
means sufficient to permit a finding, but not to compel one.37
Confusingly, the legal term “sufficient evidence” supplies a logically
necessary but not a sufficient condition for reaching a decision in
favor of the party offering that evidence.
Many evidence theorists have demonstrated great resistance to
dropping assumption 4b. As will be seen in the next section, they
have offered various “solutions” or workarounds to retain it, in-
cluding dropping assumptions 2, 3, and even 5. That is, they have
tried to change or simply exclude the axioms of probability or, in-
stead, to drop the requirement of an overall claim being probably
true.38 What explains this resistance?
We think that two beliefs account for the resistance to dropping
assumption 4b, and we believe that both are mistaken. The first is
the belief that the law requires it. In Part IV, we will show that this
is not the case. The second belief is a kind of intuition that dropping
4b is unfair to claimants. To win a simple negligence case with four
elements—duty, breach, causation and damages—the plaintiff
would have to prove each element to an average of more than a 0.84
probability (the fourth root of 0.5  0.841). This seems counterintui-
tive, because it feels as though the level of certainty that should be
required for the essential elements should not be so high in the
uncertain world of reconstructing litigated events. According to this
intuition, such high probabilities of component facts will place
unfair practical burdens on claimants; and in civil cases, those high
ed. 2013) (emphasis added). In contrast, “‘X is a necessary condition for Y ’ means that if Y is
true, then so is X. That is, it’s necessary for X to be true in order for Y to be true.” Id. at 385
(emphasis added). In our textual discussion, X is “the claimant has proven each element to
the burden of proof threshold,” and Y is “the claimant wins the claim.”
37. See, e.g., 9B CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2524 (3d ed. 2017) (providing sufficient evidence to defeat summary judgment
means showing that there is enough evidence on which a jury could reasonably find in favor
of that party).
38. See infra Part II.
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probabilities required of elements seem discordant with the more
manageable “preponderance” standard. Let’s call this intuition a
“probability gap” problem.
The probability gap is an appearance, rather than a logical issue,
and a fallacious one at that. Axioms of logic and probability, such as
the multiplication rule, are analytically true. The probability gap
becomes a problem only if one chooses to contest the internal logic
of probability rather than the intuitive perception of unfairness. If
a claimant is expected to produce a specific, probably true narrative
of his whole claim to show a defendant’s liability or guilt, there is no
logical basis to resist the analytical axiom that the probability of the
overall case is the product of the probabilities of its underlying facts.
Perhaps our untutored intuition tells us that the probability of
demonstrating negligence should instead be an average of the proba-
bilities of the elements. But that is simply a math error.
We suspect that the probability gap, though purely perceptual
and irrational, plays a significant role in giving the conjunction
problem much of its emotional and intuitive traction.39 We may be
wrong about that. And to be sure, expositors of the conjunction
problem argue that there is a formal reason for believing that the
probability gap is an analytical problem: that the law, and specifi-
cally jury instructions, require that proving each element to the
stated probability threshold is a sufficient condition for the claim-
ant’s victory.40 We will address that contention in Part IV. For now,
suffice it to say that the perception of a probability gap should carry
no weight in the analysis of whether a conjunction paradox exists
and presents a problem.
39. Cf. A.P. Dawid, The Difficulty About Conjunction, 36 STATISTICIAN 91, 92 (1987) (at-
tributing to conjunction problem expositor the “intuition” that “it is already very demanding
on the plaintiff to require that every single one of the component issues be demonstrated ...,
and that it would be unfair to demand the further establishment of the overall case”). For
examples of the intuition, see, for example, L. JONATHAN COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE
PROVABLE 58-61 (1977) (suggesting that, given the difficulty of proving each element to the
probability threshold, the “whole claim” requirement is unfair to plaintiffs); and Clermont,
supra note 6, at 1100 (“How did a strong case become a sure loser?”). Defenders of the use of
probability theory to explain burdens of proof accept the mathematical fact that the individual
probabilities of the conjuncts will have to be high. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 35, at 282-
83.
40. See, e.g., Allen & Jehl, supra note 15, at 922-29 (discussing jury instructions that
require this conclusion).
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The perception of a probability gap is magnified by a further,
somewhat hidden assumption built into the conjunction paradox.
Let’s call this one assumption 3´:
3´. The overall probability of the claim is the product of the un-
conditional probabilities of the separate elements. This product
will always be less than the lowest separate probability.
This assumption that the probabilities are unconditional is based on
the view—mistaken, as we will show—that elements of claims are
probabilistically independent events.41 In fact, in most cases ele-
ments are probabilistically dependent, requiring the multiplication
of conditional probabilities.42 Such conditional probabilities are still
between 0 and 1, meaning that the product will still be less than or
equal to the lowest probability.43 But the conditional probabilities
are likely to be higher—often much higher—than unconditional
ones, mitigating the appearance of an excessive probability gap
between proof of the elements and proof of the claim.
II. PREVIOUS SOLUTIONS TO THE CONJUNCTION PROBLEM
Some, if not most, evidence scholars have come to doubt whether
it is possible ever to “dispose[ ] of the conjunction paradox as a for-
mal matter.”44 If “formal matter” in this comment means a solution
based entirely on mathematics or on proof derived from the axioms
of probability, we agree—and readers looking for that type of so-
lution will no doubt be disappointed with our argument. Other evi-
dence scholars addressing the conjunction problem have offered
theoretical workarounds. These workarounds involve changing or
dropping some combination of assumptions 2, 3, or 5 entailed by the
conjunction paradox. In evaluating these workarounds, it is worth
considering whether the conjunction problem is serious enough to
justify the complexity of adopting alternative probability rules, bar-
ring the use of probability rules, or enabling claimants to win claims
that may be far below a “more probable than not” threshold.
41. See infra Part III.B.
42. See infra Part III.C.
43. See Cheng, supra note 10, at 1256-57, 1257 n.5.
44. See Allen & Jehl, supra note 15, at 929.
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A. Alternative Forms of Probability
Although L. Jonathan Cohen was not the first to notice the con-
junction problem, he launched the ongoing debate surrounding it.45
Cohen argued that the conjunction paradox, along with other proof
paradoxes, presented compelling evidence that standard probability
theory—which he called “Pascalian”—is inapplicable to legal fact-
finding, because (in his view) the former is concerned only with the
frequency of recurring events and the latter with the reconstruction
of unique past events.46 Cohen did not win a consensus among
evidence scholars that his alternative “Baconian” probability theory,
assuming he successfully axiomatized it, actually solved the proof
paradoxes or offered a convincing account of adjudicative proof.47
Nevertheless, his general critique of standard probability theory has
been quite influential among evidence scholars, many of whom have
adopted his view that standard probability theory is inapplicable to
adjudicative fact-finding.48
Kevin Clermont has advanced a different proposal for adopting
an alternative probabilistic theory in his recent ambitious effort to
solve the conjunction paradox. Clermont argues that fuzzy logic
better fits the logic of jury decision-making and of the standard of
proof than traditional probability theory.49 Fuzzy logic, according to
Clermont, furnishes a quantitative judgment about how well a
statement applies to a situation, rather than a probability of its ap-
plying exactly.50 For example, “Think of a somewhat sloppily drawn
45. The earliest expositor of the conjunction paradox seems to have been Laurence Tribe
in 1971. See Tribe, supra note 25. The debate heated up after Cohen’s 1977 book. See
Spottswood, supra note 6, at 259 (citing COHEN, supra note 39, at 58-67).
46. See COHEN, supra note 39, at 58-67 (positing a holistic “Baconian” probability theory
as an alternative to traditional “Pascalian” probability theory).
47. See Richard D. Friedman, Assessing Evidence, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1810, 1819-20 (1996)
(book review) (arguing that Cohen’s “Baconian” probability theory is inapplicable to, and
misunderstands, legal reasoning).
48. See, e.g., Allen & Jehl, supra note 15, at 929, 938 (arguing that probability of whole
claim should not be viewed as the product of the probability of the conjunction of elements);
Allen & Stein, supra note 1, at 560 (“[T]he relative plausibility approach outperforms math-
ematical probability operationally and normatively.”); Clermont, supra note 6, at 1080-86
(arguing that probability theory is better suited to predicting future events than to recon-
structing past ones).
49. See Clermont, supra note 6, at 1085.
50. See id. at 1084-85.
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circle: is it more appropriate to say (i) there is a 90% probability
that it is a perfect circle or (ii) it has a .90 membership in the set of
circles?”51 Fuzzy logic seeks to take account of vagueness where the
factual dispute turns not on our degree of belief in whether an event
either did or did not occur but on the degree to which an occurrence
fits a category.52 Says Clermont, “causation, consent, coercion, good
faith, intent, and a host of other legal issues” occur by degrees
rather than as all-or-nothing propositions.53 But at the same time,
Clermont claims, “bivalent” probabilistic logic “is a special case of
multivalent [fuzzy] logic,” meaning that fuzzy logic can accommo-
date traditional yes or no questions, such as whether a defendant
was the perpetrator in a disputed identity case.54
According to Clermont, fuzzy logic solves the conjunction problem
by replacing the multiplication rule with a “MIN” (that is, “mini-
mum”) operator, which mandates that the probability of a conjunc-
tion is the lesser of the values of the conjuncts rather than their
product.55 Let F(S) represent the degree of certainty that fuzzy logic
assigns to a statement S. The minimum rule says that F(A & B) =
MIN[F(A), F(B)]. So a plaintiff who has shown his claim to have a
60% certainty of fault, and a 70% certainty of causation of damages,
has proven his case to an overall certainty of 60%. Problem solved.
Clermont may well be right that fuzzy logic offers certain ad-
vantages for the analysis of vagueness, which is its traditional
justification.56 We are less convinced by his attempted demonstra-
tion that fuzzy logic better captures the probability of a conjunction
than standard probability theory, or that it entails abandonment of
the multiplication rule for conjunctions. Clermont’s case for the MIN
operator—the crux of his argument—seems to rest on the assump-
tion that standard probability theory covers only a narrow range of
probability statements.57 But, does the (traditional or “nonfuzzy”)
51. Id. at 1082.
52. See id. at 1080-81.
53. Id. at 1082.
54. See id. at 1084. 
55. See id. at 1089-92.
56. See Petr Hajek, Fuzzy Logic, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Fall 2010
ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/logic-fuzzy/ [https://perma.cc/C7Y6-
372S].
57. See Clermont, supra note 6, at 1070 (noting standard probability theory’s difficulty
with “partial truths”).
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probability statement “I am 90% certain that this is a circle” mean
exactly “I believe there is a 90% probability that this is a perfect
circle”? Does it, correspondingly, exclude such meanings as, “this
circle, though imperfect, seems to overlap with 90% of the character-
istics of a perfect circle”? Clermont assumes that the answers to
these questions are yes—requiring abandonment of traditional
probability in favor of fuzzy logic58—but we don’t see why that
should be so.
Using this assumption as a starting point, Clermont tries to val-
idate the MIN rule by offering various examples, of which the
following is typical:
Imagine the law is trying to determine if Tom himself was at
fault, that is, whether the perpetrator was Tom and whether the
perpetrator was at fault....
....
...[W]e want to know if Tom’s fault is sufficiently true, not the
chances of somehow discovering both the perpetrator certainly
to be Tom and the perpetrator to be completely at fault.... If Tom
is 60% likely the perpetrator, and the perpetrator is 70% at
fault, the 60% figure means that it is 60% likely that Tom is
surely the person who was 70% at fault. We thus have a 60%
chance of Tom’s being legally at fault, just as the MIN rule
would say.59
Clermont’s analytical move here is to round the 0.7 probability up
to 1.0: by showing a 70% membership in the vague or fuzzy category
of fault, which Clermont intuits is good enough for liability, the
plaintiff “wins” that element and is entitled to a finding of fault.60
Clermont thus has reformulated the problem as the probability of
liability given fault. If the two elements of the case are A (“Tom is
the perpetrator”) and B (“the perpetrator is at fault”), and A = 0.6
and B = 1 (by Clermont’s assumption), then the probability of A and
B under the product rule equals 0.6. Of course, the product rule
generates the same result as the MIN operator whenever the
probabilities other than the minimum equal 1. But this hardly
58. See id. at 1081-85 (discussing the advantages of fuzzy logic over traditional proba-
bility).
59. Id. at 1098-99.
60. See id.
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proves the applicability of the MIN operator rather than the product
rule.
Nor do we fully understand the basis for Clermont’s suggestion
that the probability of an element should be rounded up to 1.0
whenever the plaintiff “wins” that element by proving it to a
threshold greater than 0.5. In Clermont’s example, the fact that
“Tom is the perpetrator” is a yes or no question, whereas “fault” is
a category subject to vagueness or degrees of truth. These con-
structed characteristics may add a veneer of explanatory power to
the example, but are really irrelevant, because Clermont asserts
that the MIN operator applies to all efforts to reconstruct past
events, regardless of the presence of vagueness. “[I]f you are looking
back to the past, ... [y]ou are no longer trying to figure the odds of
two things being sure, but rather how sure you are that one thing
happened while you remain somewhat sure that the other hap-
pened.”61 Indeed, all of Clermont’s examples seem to follow this pat-
tern, treating elements other than the MIN as “somewhat sure” and
“thus” equal to 1.62 That seems to assume a very unfuzzy world in
which proven elements are 100% true and unproven ones 100%
false.63 In any event, this assumption eliminates the need for fuzzy
logic and the MIN operator: if all the elements with probabilities
greater than 0.5 (or all but the lowest or minimum) are rounded up
to 1, the conjunction problem disappears even under the multiplica-
tion rule. Indeed, it turns out that we find that the same “rounding
up to 1.0” move has been pressed by other writers who haven’t re-
sorted to fuzzy logic.64
61. Id. at 1099.
62. See, e.g., id. at 1096-97 (arguing that “a .6 membership in the set of chairs and a .5
membership in the red set” produces a .5 membership in the set of “red chairs,” implying that
the membership in the chair set is reflected in a multiplier of 1); id. at 1103 (assuming that
in determining the probability of drawing two black balls, the color of the first ball is known,
and therefore has a probability of 1); id. at 1103-04 (implying that fault proven to 70% should
be converted to 1).
63. Apparently, in at least some versions of fuzzy analysis, the inputs are “fuzzified” and
ultimately restated as “crisp” outputs. See Hajek, supra note 56. That does not seem to ex-
plain Clermont’s rounding up, however, which occurs prior to the calculation generating the
output. See Clermont, supra note 6, at 1101 (demonstrating the MIN calculation).
64. For example, according to Charles Nesson, “Once jurors have decided that an element
is probable, they are to consider the element established, repress any remaining doubts about
it, and proceed to consider the next element.” Nesson, supra note 28, at 1386 (emphasis
added). Repressing remaining doubts means rounding the probability up to 1.0. To the same
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B. Elements, Not Claims
Formal efforts to solve the conjunction problem, like those above,
have been much less common than pragmatic workarounds that
accept the notion that the conjunction problem will never be solved.
Several scholars have argued that we simply have to come to terms
with the fact that in most cases, the conjuncts will multiply out to
less than a 0.5 probability for the whole claim—even though the
plaintiff should win many of those cases. One group of these schol-
ars has argued that because the probabilities of the individual
conjuncts are what really matter, we can simply ignore the probabil-
ity of the conjunction taken as a whole.65
According to Charles Nesson, for example, the legal system sim-
ply “refus[es] to adopt the conjunction rule.”66 Instead it considers
proof of the elements separately “to project its verdicts as state-
ments about what happened,” in order to better achieve the deter-
rent aims of the substantive law.67 Nesson finds justification in an
argument that prefigures the embrace of “inference to the best ex-
planation” by evidence theorists.68
Application of the more-probable-than-not test to each element
produces the most acceptable conclusion as to that element. The
conjunction of these conclusions constitutes a story that is more
probable than any other story about the same elements.
Suppose, for example, that the elements of a story are A and B,
and A (70%) is more probable than not-A (30%), and B (60%) is
more probable than not-B (40%). The conjunction (A & B) (42%)
effect, see Alex Stein, An Essay on Uncertainty and Fact-Finding in Civil Litigation, with
Special Reference to Contract Cases, 48 U. TORONTO L.J. 299, 311 n.27 (1998) (arguing that
a favorable finding on an element converts to a “declaratory judgment,” presumably with a
probability of 1.0). Stein has since disclaimed this view. See Allen & Stein, supra note 1, at
595 & nn.190-91.
65. For example, Saul Levmore has argued that permitting claimants to recover on less-
than-probable civil claims is justified as compensation for the difficulty in persuading multiple
jurors to agree on the same set of propositions, as reflected in the Condorcet Jury Theorem.
See Saul Levmore, Conjunction and Aggregation, 99 MICH. L. REV. 723, 734-45 (2001); see also
Alex Stein, Of Two Wrongs That Make a Right: Two Paradoxes of the Evidence Law and Their
Combined Economic Justification, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1199 (2001) (arguing that the element ap-
proach may offset economic inefficiencies created by other evidence rules). 
66. Nesson, supra note 28, at 1390.
67. See id.
68. See infra Part II.C.
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may not be more probable than its negation (not-(A & B)) (58%).
But the conjunction (A & B) (42%) is more probable than any
other version: (A & (not-B)) (28%), ((not-A) & B) (18%), or ((not-
A) & (not-B)) (12%). The application of the more-probable-than-
not standard of proof on an element-by-element basis will
produce the single most probable story.69
Nesson’s example only works if we assume that the defendant
must pick just one of the three “versions” of the “story” that estab-
lish “not-(A & B).” But the “each element” instructions tell us that
the defendant need only disprove one element to win.70 The defen-
dant’s case can consist of any “story” that entails either not-A or not-
B.71 The defendant thus need only prove the disjunction (not-A) or
(not-B), and is thus entitled to add the probabilities of the three not-
(A & B) scenarios.72 Moreover, even if the plaintiff produces more
probable stories on individual elements, the defendant might
produce “the single most probable story” by defending less than all
the elements. Suppose the defendant produces a 40% probable story
of not-A, and produces no evidence on B, but the jury credits the
plaintiff ’s case on B only to a 60% probability. In that case, the
plaintiff will have proven each element but failed to “produce the
single most probable story”: his liability story has a 36% probability,
compared to the 40% defense story. To shore up his argument,
Nesson would have to assume, contrary to prevailing legal rules,
that a jury is required to give 100% credence to unopposed evidence
offered by the claimant.73
69. Nesson, supra note 28, at 1389-90 (footnote omitted).
70. See Allen & Jehl, supra note 15, at 897-902 (overviewing “each element” instructions).
71. See id. at 899 (noting that “each element” instructions require the plaintiff to prove
every element to win a claim).
72. Where, as here, not-A and not-B are not mutually exclusive, Pr(not-A or not-B) =
Pr(not-A) + Pr(not-B) - Pr(not-A & not-B). See HACKING, supra note 8, at 40-41. Using
Nesson’s example, Pr(not-A or not-B) = 0.3 + 0.4 - 0.12 = 0.58. Proponents of IBE have realized
this problem and abandoned the implication that the defendant is required to pick just one
of the possible stories negating A & B. See Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 250-53 (IBE
permits aggregation of disjunctive explanations); see also Pardo, supra note 6, at 1839 (same).
73. See 32A C.J.S. Evidence § 1641 (2017) (jury not required to believe uncontradicted
evidence); see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 151 (2000)
(suggesting that summary judgment cannot be based on even uncontradicted testimony from
impeached or interested witnesses).
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Even if we accepted Nesson’s “single most probable story claim,”
the more obvious problem remains. As Clermont observes: “The
implications are profound but boggling. Allowing recovery on a 36%
showing of causation and fault [where each of those two elements
is proven to a 60% level of certainty] is not only unfair but ineffi-
cient. How embarrassing for the law!”74 Aside from its formal
failings, Nesson’s argument also flies in the face of jury reasoning.
A 36% chance that the plaintiff ’s claim is true implies a 64% chance
that it is untrue, according to probability theory.75 The “story model”
tells us that jurors seek out a single unifying narrative of liability,
and it is hard to imagine them following instructions based on
viewing each element in isolation and ignoring the probability of the
whole—deciding in favor of a party whose story it disbelieves.76 If
Nesson’s response would be that the jury believes the plaintiff ’s
story more than any one of the defendant’s, his argument would
merge with “inference to the best explanation,” which we address in
the next Section.77
C. The “Explanatory” or “Inference to the Best Explanation”
Approach
The purpose of systems of philosophic logic and probability theory
is to attempt to take statements about facts and beliefs made in
natural language and to capture their meaning in formal structures
that can be turned around to analyze the statements. The statement
“X is probably true” can be formulated as an assertion that the
probability that X is true exceeds the probability that X is false, or
Pr(X) > Pr(not-X). This statement presupposes that X is more
74. Clermont, supra note 6, at 1108; see also Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 254 (focusing
serially on each element produces a result that “does not distribute errors evenly among
parties and therefore is unlikely to increase the accuracy of outcomes”).
75. See, e.g., HACKING, supra note 8, at 41.
76. See Ronald J. Allen, The Nature of Juridical Proof, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 373, 398-402
(1991) (describing “story model” research and its implications for juries).
77. Our categorization of the various approaches to solve the conjunction problem overlaps
with, but differs from, Spottswood’s recent analysis, identifying “explanationist” and “novel
mathematical” approaches. See Spottswood, supra note 6, at 293-94. We agree with Spotts-
wood that Clermont’s and Nesson’s accounts can be reduced to the problematic claim that the
probability of a conjunction is equal to its least probable element, which Spottswood calls the
“Least Likely Element Rule.” Id. at 284.
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probable than the sum of the probabilities incorporated in its ne-
gation, not-X.
Several evidence theorists have challenged this view by suggest-
ing, in essence, that the statement “X is probably true” should be
recast to mean that “X is the best explanation among the known
alternatives,” irrespective of whether the probability of X can be
said to exceed 0.5.78 This theory is adapted from “inference to the
best explanation” (IBE), an approach advocated by some contempo-
rary philosophers,79 and renamed the “explanatory” or “explanation-
based” theory. Most closely associated with the work of Professors
Michael Pardo and Ronald Allen,80 Explanatory or IBE theory
argues that litigation fact-finders decide cases by choosing the more
plausible of the two competing explanations offered by the claimant
and the defendant, instead of considering all possible explanations.81
Rather than attempting to compare the strength of the claimant’s
case (its narrative, or explanation of the evidence) to an abstract
and elusive numerical standard of 0.5 probability (or 0.9 in criminal
cases), the jury instead can use the purportedly more tangible
criterion, the strength of the defendant’s case, as the benchmark.82
This strength is measured by non-numerical criteria: “coherence,
consistency, coverage of the evidence, completeness, causal articula-
tion, simplicity, and consilience (understood as the breadth of the
explanation).”83 Drawing on “story model” research, IBE proponents
claim that their explanation-based theory offers the “best explan-
ation” of trial fact-finding, arguing that it explains the actuality of
jury decision-making better than probability theory or Bayesian-
ism.84
78. See Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 223.
79. See generally PETER LIPTON, INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATION (1993); Gilbert H.
Harman, The Inference to the Best Explanation, 74 PHIL. REV. 88 (1965).
80. See Pardo & Allen, supra note 3. Allen began adapting IBE to evidence law as early
as the 1980s and has since then refined his theory. See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen, A Reconceptuali-
zation of Civil Trials, 66 B.U. L. REV. 401, 403 (1986); Allen, supra note 76, at 381-82 (arguing
that trials work best if the fact-finder is understood and required to choose the more
believable of the conflicting narratives offered by the parties).
81. See Pardo, supra note 6, at 1839.
82. See Allen & Stein, supra note 1, at 568.
83. Id.
84. See id. at 571; see also Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 256, 258-60; Michael S. Pardo,
The Nature and Purpose of Evidence Theory, 66 VAND. L. REV. 547, 608-09 (2013).
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There is certainly some force to the Explanatory theory argument
that jurors decide cases holistically, that they do not assign precise
numerical values to their assessments of probability, and that they
fail to make rigorous probabilistic calculations, such as multiplying
the probabilities of conjunct elements of claims.85 Whether the Ex-
planatory account is or isn’t a better account of the burden of proof
than the standard probability model is not a question we purport to
answer here.86 Instead, we will analyze the claim that IBE solves,
or avoids (or “tames”), the conjunction problem. IBE proponents
claim that it does, and hold this out to be a significant selling point
of their theory, making it superior to the standard probability
account of the burden of proof.87
85. See Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 260.
86. It might be worth noting that IBE’s consistency with jury instructions is decidedly
mixed. In our survey of jury instructions, including civil instructions from forty-seven jurisdic-
tions (states and federal circuits) and criminal instructions from forty-five jurisdictions, we
examined whether burden of proof instructions directed juries to assess the claimant’s case
by a probabilistic threshold or by comparison to the defendant’s case. IBE, of course, supposes
that juries do the latter. In civil cases, twenty-one jurisdictions defined the burden of proof
by a probabilistic threshold: that plaintiff meets the burden by showing his claims to be “more
probable than not” or the equivalent. Seventeen jurisdictions used a comparative standard,
suggestive of IBE: either directing juries to decide in favor of the stronger case, plaintiff ’s or
defendant’s, or defining “preponderance of the evidence” as “the greater weight of the evi-
dence.” Nine jurisdictions were ambiguous on this distinction. See infra Part IV.C.
While IBE-type definitions of burden of proof represented a substantial minority of civil
instructions (36%), they were almost nonexistent in criminal cases. See infra Part IV.C. No
jurisdiction defined “beyond a reasonable doubt” in terms suggestive of a best explanation
comparing the strength of the plaintiff ’s and defendant’s case, undoubtedly because the law
does not require the defendant to present a case. See infra Part IV.C. The closest thing to an
IBE-type instruction in a criminal case was three jurisdictions (out of forty-five) directing
juries to “compare and consider” the evidence. See, e.g., JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA
CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 221 (JUDICIAL COUNCIL ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS 2017) (“In deciding whether the People have proved an allegation beyond a
reasonable doubt, you must impartially compare and consider all the evidence that was
received during this trial.”).
87. See, e.g., Allen & Stein, supra note 1, at 571 (“The relative plausibility structure of
adjudicative fact-finding has three striking advantages. First, it solves the conjunction and
all other paradoxes encountered by the frequentist account of juridical proof.”); Pardo, supra
note 84, at 608 (arguing that Explanatory theory provides normative guidance, in part by
“resolv[ing] any potential ‘conjunction’ problems”); see also Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at
253, 255 (arguing that while the conjunction problem “pose[s] a serious challenge to the
[standard probability] approach,” the Explanatory account “does much better ... in taming the
conjunction paradox”);  Spottswood, supra note 6, at 271 (reading Pardo and Allen to argue
that avoidance of conjunction problem is a reason to adopt their theory over probabilistic
account).
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1. Avoiding the Conjunction Problem (1): The Holistic Solution
Explanatory theory proponents state their claim to avoid the
conjunction problem with great assurance, but the details are
actually unclear. According to Pardo and Allen’s leading account: 
[A]n explanatory approach based on relative plausibility avoids
the [conjunction] paradox. In civil cases, fact finders infer the
best explanation of the evidence as a whole; in doing so they now
have an accepted explanation that may or may not instantiate
all of the formal elements of the claim. If it does, then the claim-
ant ought to win; if not, not. In doing so, the formal paradox is
effectively neutralized.88
We refer to this as IBE’s “holistic” solution to the conjunction
problem. Pardo and Allen’s statement seems to argue simply that
jurors can and do fail or refuse to acknowledge and apply the mul-
tiplication rule to conjunctions (and so, therefore, can evidence
scholars). Instead, jurors decide the claim holistically: they “first
select an explanation” and only then do they “determine whether it
includes the formal elements, rather than deciding the elements
serially (which generates the paradoxes).”89
What does it mean for the explanation to “instantiate” or “in-
clude” “the formal elements”? Explanatory theorists don’t clearly
explain, but presumably that requires looking at the elements in-
dividually to determine that the plaintiff has the best explanation
on each element. For if, alternatively, an element had to cross a 0.5
probability threshold to be “included” or “instantiated,” then Ex-
planatory theory would find itself in the odd position of saying that
0.5 is an unduly abstract standard for a whole claim, but a usable
one for an element.
Since the best explanation must be evaluated at both the whole
claim and the element level to determine “inclusion” or “instan-
tiation” of each element, the fact-finder—contrary to Pardo’s
88. Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 255-56 (footnotes omitted). Since the defendant’s case
does not have to include “all of the formal elements,” see id. at 256, a finding that the best
explanation does not include one or more of the formal elements presumably means finding
the defendant’s explanation to be the best available.
89. Pardo, supra note 84, at 608-09.
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assertion—still must “decid[e] the elements serially.”90 The plaintiff
must win at both levels. So unless the Explanatory theorists argue
that the axioms of probability can be willed away,91 nothing in their
account has done away with the conditions that work together to
create the conjunction problem. First, we still have the potentially
conflicting decision rules: that plaintiff wins by providing the best
overall explanation, and that plaintiff wins by providing the best
explanation as to each element. Second, we still have the axiomatic
relationship between the probability of the elements and the prob-
ability of the overall claim, which is their product.
Disclaiming reliance on numbers does not make the conjunc-
tion problem go away, because better explanations are still those
that both comprise elements and that are more probable overall.
Notably, IBE proponents at times use numerical probability state-
ments to illustrate their theory. Pardo, for instance, explains that
if “a plaintiff offers a story that a reasonable jury concludes is 0.4
likely and the defendant offers a story that the jury concludes is 0.2
likely,” the plaintiff should win under IBE because “the plaintiff’s
account is twice as likely to be true as the defendant’s alternative
account.”92
If the plaintiff still has to win (“include” or “instantiate”) each
element, in addition to winning the whole claim, the conjunction
problem is replicated, unless providing the best explanation ele-
ment-by-element is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a
plaintiff victory. In other words, IBE’s “holistic solution” avoids the
conjunction problem only to the extent that it replicates the account
first articulated by Nance and elaborated upon by us below.93 That
90. See id.
91. Despite some gestures in that direction by its proponents, see, e.g., Allen & Stein,
supra note 1, at 602 (“[O]ur factfinding system refuses to guide itself by mathematical
probability.”), we do not read IBE to make this claim. Thus, for example, Pardo and Allen
argue that “a simpler explanation may be more likely [because] more complex explanations
involve more auxiliary premises and background assumptions and, therefore, more places to
go wrong.” Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 230 n.19. This is simply a plain language restate-
ment of the multiplication rules for conjunction: the more conjuncts to be multiplied, the lower
the probability of the conjunction. See Clermont, supra note 6, at 1096 (asserting that conjunc-
tion probability approaches zero as more elements are added).
92. Pardo, supra note 84, at 592-93; cf. David Kaye, The Laws of Probability and the Law
of the Land, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 34, 44 (1979) (“[S]ubjectively interpreted probabilities are
logically compatible with the mathematical structure of probability theory.”).
93. See Nance, supra note 18, at 950; infra Part IV.
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is to say, inclusion of the elements is a necessary but not sufficient
condition for plaintiff ’s victory, which also requires a holistic finding
of probability.94 That the Explanatory theorists disclaim reliance on
Nance’s argument suggests that they do not see matters this way,95
but that’s just a blind spot. All that Explanatory theory tells us is
that fact-finders perform these two tasks—determining the most
probable whole claim, and the most probable explanation of each
element—without actually conducting a multiplication.96 But re-
quiring a “holistic” finding that “instantiates” each element is the
same as saying that there is a whole claim condition and an each
element condition, and that the latter is necessary but not suffi-
cient.97 The Explanatory theory thus seems to be groping toward
Nance’s account. There is nothing wrong with Explanatory theorists
embracing Nance’s account more consciously, but the bad news for
them is that Nance’s account works even under the standard Pr(A)
> 0.5 formulation of the burden of proof.98 In other words, nothing
in the Explanatory theory’s “holistic” solution to the conjunction
problem advantages Explanatory theory over the standard proba-
bility model. 
2. Avoiding the Conjunction Problem (2): The Probabilistic
Solution
Instead of what we label the “holistic” account, IBE/Explanatory
theory may be seeking a different path to outdoing standard proba-
bility theory in its ability to avoid the conjunction problem. Explana-
tory theorists might argue that the Explanatory theory does not
require the parties’ claims to occupy the entire probability space,
equaling 1.0.99 Therefore, the plaintiff ’s explanation A can be the
best even when Pr(A)  0.5.100 Under the standard probabilistic
conception of the preponderance of the evidence, the probability of
94. See Nance, supra note 18, at 950.
95. See Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 238-41 (considering their theorization incompat-
ible with Nance’s work on the conjunction problem).
96. See id. at 255-56.
97. Cf. Nance, supra note 18, at 950.
98. See id.
99. See Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 256 (criticizing standard probability theory for this
requirement).
100. See id.
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plaintiff ’s claim A must be “more probably than not true.” Standard
probability theory interprets “more probably than not true” to imply
a pair of propositions, in this case A and not-A.101 By assumption, A
and not-A are mutually exclusive, jointly exhaustive alternatives,
which tells us that Pr(A) + Pr(not-A) = 1, by axiom.102 Therefore,
Pr(A) > Pr(not-A) if and only if Pr(A) > 0.5. Maybe the Explanatory
account resolves the conjuction problem by modifying the “whole
claim condition”—replacing the Pr(A) > 0.5 requirement with a rule
that the probability of plaintiff ’s case A need only be greater than
the probability of the defendant’s case X: Pr(A) > Pr(X), where Pr(A)
can be equal to or less than 0.5.103
Note that, in this version, the Explanatory theory’s treatment of
the burden of proof does no analytical work—that is, it fails to
distinguish itself from the standard Pr(A) > 0.5 account—where the
fact-finder considers the entire probability space. That space con-
sists of the full range of scenarios summing to a probability of 1.0.
In such a case, Pr(A) > Pr(X) and Pr(A) > 0.5 are equivalent
statements. To be sure, the range of scenarios supporting civil
liability or criminal guilt, and their opposites, are theoretically
infinite.104 But most of these scenarios in many cases will have a de
minimis probability, so that the probabilities placed before the
factfinder will sum very close to 1.0.105 In those instances, the
standard Pr(A) > 0.5 account may well be a good approximation—
the “best explanation,” if you will—of the burden of proof.
For IBE to have real theoretical bite, there must be a significant
number of cases in which the probabilities placed before the
factfinder add up to significantly less than 1.0. Pardo and Allen
recognize this: 
[T]he standard problem of trials is not to accumulate all the
stories for the parties and see which collectively adds up to great
[sic] than .5. Rather, the standard problem may be something
more like the probability of the plaintiff ’s case being .4, and the
101. See HACKING, supra note 8, at 40-41.
102. See id.
103. See Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 256.
104. See Friedman, supra note 20, at 92.
105. See id.
2017] THE CONJUNCTION PROBLEM 649
respective probabilities of the two [disjunctive] defenses each
being .1.106
Viewed this way, IBE seems to avoid the conjunction problem by
permitting jury verdicts in favor of the plaintiff when the product of
the probabilities of elements is less than 0.5.107 Cases falling into the
“probability gap” can still result in plaintiff victories so long as Pr(A)
> Pr(X).
But this “probabilistic” version of Explanatory theory’s conjunc-
tion problem solution, like the previous “holistic” version, fails to
improve upon the standard Pr(A) > 0.5 account. For the plaintiff to
win with Pr(A)  Pr(X) where Pr(A)  0.5, one or both of two things
has to be true. Either there must be a substantial probability at-
tached to “unpresented” explanations—that is to say, explanations
that have not been presented by the parties—or the defendant must
be precluded from presenting a disjunctive case. Both of these con-
sequences of IBE may undermine goals of the adjudication system
and thereby impose unwanted costs.
Let’s first consider the problem of unpresented explanations. If
plaintiff ’s case consists of two elements each proven to 60%, the
probability of plaintiff ’s case is 0.36. To be a better explanation than
defendant’s case, the latter must have a probability less than or
equal to 0.35. With the explanations presented by the parties adding
up to 71% probability or less, there must be nearly a 30% or greater
probability “unaccounted for” at trial. That is, there must be un-
presented explanations whose probability sums to nearly 0.3, or
more. To change the scenario slightly, assume that plaintiff ’s case
consists of three elements each proven to 60%, so that the probabil-
ity of plaintiff ’s case is 0.216; for that to be the “best explanation,”
defendant’s case must be less than or equal to 0.215, leaving a sum
total of nearly 60% probability of unpresented explanations. If the
bulk of these unpresented explanations favor the defendant, the risk
of erroneous decisions seems rather high.
To be sure, IBE proponents sometimes say that the defendant
should not benefit from unpresented explanations. In that event,
IBE must either make a normative claim that fairness concerns
106. Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 256.
107. See id.
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counterbalance this risk of error,108 or make an empirical claim that
the distribution of unpresented explanations cannot be known to
favor either plaintiff or defendant, and should thus be disregard-
ed.109 But if we rule out unpresented explanations, then IBE once
again converges with the standard Pr(A) > 0.5 account, because it
will have recreated, by fiat, a world for trial purposes in which Pr(A)
and Pr(X) occupy the entire probability space that the jury may
consider: Pr(A) + Pr(X) = 1.
Alternatively, IBE might bar defendants from disjunctive
explanations. We have already seen this problem in Nesson’s
account.110 If plaintiff ’s case consists of two elements each proven to
60%, the probability of plaintiff ’s case is 0.36. But defendant’s case
as to each element has a probability of 0.4. If defendant’s case as to
each element is permitted to be considered as a disjunction, the
probability of defendant’s case overall is 0.64.111 Plaintiff loses this
case under IBE’s decision rule Pr(A) > Pr(X) if we consider the whole
claim, yet plaintiff has offered the best explanation as to each
element. Viewed this way, IBE replicates the conjunction paradox.
The “relative plausibility” theory previously advanced by Allen112
has this problem, along with certain limitations both as a descrip-
tion of actual jury behavior and as a description of legal and
evidentiary procedures. The fact that jurors need to be cautioned in
every trial not to speculate—that is, to avoid filling in evidentiary
gaps with their own hypotheses113—suggests that it is quite natural
108. See, e.g., Allen & Jehl, supra note 15, at 932-33 (suggesting conventional probability
account impossibly requires plaintiff “to specify, and disprove, all the ways in which someone
other than the defendant might have caused the result”); Pardo, supra note 84, at 593 n.197
(“[T]o truly prove a case beyond 0.5 requires a plaintiff to disprove all the other ways the
world could have been from what the plaintiff alleges,” which “is an impossible task.”).
109. Allen, who claims to be advancing IBE purely descriptively, would presumably incline
toward the latter view, while Pardo argues for the normative desirability of IBE. Compare
Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 226 (“[T]he primary focus of our explanation-based account
will be descriptive and explanatory.”), with Pardo, supra note 84, at 598 (explanatory theory
“provides normative guidance”).
110. See supra notes 69-77 and accompanying text.
111. This is the sum of the two probabilities minus their product, 0.8 - 0.16 = 0.64. See
supra note 72.
112. See Allen, supra note 80, at 425-31; Allen & Jehl, supra note 15, at 936-43.
113. See, e.g., STANDARD FINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS No. 1 (SIDNEY I. SCHENKIER 2015),
http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/_assets/_documents/_forms/_judges/SCHENKIER/JuryInst.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W88L-X6T2]; see also David S. Schwartz, Festschrift in Honor of Eleanor
Swift, An Excess of Discretion? “Thayer’s Triumph” and the Uncodified Exclusion of Specula-
2017] THE CONJUNCTION PROBLEM 651
for jurors to want to go outside the parties’ presented narratives
when deliberating. Indeed, the reason why trial practice manuals
(and the “story model” research) so strongly advise trial practitio-
ners to tell comprehensive stories is precisely because jurors will
naturally tend to make up facts that are not provided to them, if
doing so strikes them as important to making the story conform to
the qualities of good explanations, mentioned above.114
Our expectation that jurors evaluate evidence by comparing it to
generalizations based on their common sense and experience further
suggests that unpresented explanations are baked into the decision-
making process. For instance: “A person with a gun pointed at him
probably feels fear.” “A person who utters racial epithets is more
likely to have racially biased attitudes.” “A person with a financial
interest in the outcome of a case is more likely than a disinterested
witness to shade his testimony.” These are a few examples of the
innumerable generalizations about the world that we expect—in-
deed, count on—jurors to bring to the fact-finding process.115 Though
expected, and indeed necessary, the use of such generalizations cre-
ates the likelihood that the jury will develop and consider unpre-
sented explanations and assign them a value greater than zero.
An additional difficulty facing IBE’s account of the burden of
proof is the legal rule that the plaintiff does not automatically win
even when the defendant offers no affirmative contrary explana-
tion.116 Juries are not required to believe even uncontested evi-
dence,117 and defense cases often consist of attacks on the credibility
of the plaintiff ’s witnesses, disbelief of whom can lead to the failure
of proof on an essential element. Consider a product liability case in
which the plaintiff ’s explanatory story is that he suffered a stroke
caused by taking the defendant’s anti-cholesterol drug Reactin. The
defendant does not offer an alternative “story,” explanation, or even
argument, of how some causal agent or agents other than Reactin—
such as smoking, high-stress lifestyle, alcohol consumption, or what
tive Evidence, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 591, 593-97 (2017) (discussing certain categories of “specu-
lative” evidence).
114. See Pardo, supra note 84, at 552.
115. See, e.g., Warger v. Shauers, 135 S. Ct. 521, 525 (2014) (acknowledging that jurors
bring their personal experiences into deliberations).
116. See 32A C.J.S. Evidence § 1641 (2017).
117. See id.
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have you—probably caused the stroke. Nor does the defendant even
claim that Reactin did not cause the stroke. Instead, the defendant’s
case is that the plaintiff ’s experts did not use a reliable methodology
in concluding that Reactin probably did cause the stroke. The jury
finds for the defendant—as it is entitled to do—because it disbe-
lieves the plaintiff ’s expert testimony. This example, based loosely
on Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,118 is not an outlier,
nor is it specific to expert witness admissibility issues or summary
judgment. Although in Daubert, the Ninth Circuit on remand
excluded a key expert witness and granted summary judgment,119
it remains true that even if the plaintiff ’s expert testimony had been
admitted and the case gone to trial, the jury would have been
entitled to disbelieve the plaintiff ’s expert based on the testimony
of the defense experts and find for the defendant accordingly.120 This
scenario represents a not-uncommon pattern in disputed-cause
cases, in which the defendant asserts “we simply don’t know how
the plaintiff was harmed.”
To call this defense the “best explanation” of the evidence is sim-
ply to finesse the definition of “explanation.” The plaintiff ’s stroke
is undisputed; the defendant’s negation of causation is no explana-
tion of how the plaintiff ’s stroke occurred in any meaningful sense
of the term “explanation.” It jars with our intuitive sense of what
“explanation” means. But we need not rely on intuition. It cannot
be what IBE means by “explanation,” even one limited to the causa-
tion issue rather than the whole case. By saying “we cannot know
the cause,” the defense in effect asserts the sum of all possible al-
ternative negating explanations. Rather than the IBE formula of
comparing Pr(A) and Pr(X), the jury is asked to compare Pr(A) to
Pr(not-A).121 This is simply a reversion to the standard probability
model. While there are a handful of statements in the IBE literature
suggesting that the jury can consider and aggregate all possible not-
118. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
119. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1322 (9th Cir. 1995). There, the
Ninth Circuit ultimately held that no reasonable jury could find for the plaintiff based on the
defense experts’ refutation of the plaintiffs’ experts. Id. at 1320-22. But that famous case
name should not send us down a tangential road of expert admissibility issues. The point is
that the defendant successfully defended the case without presenting any sort of explanatory
narrative of causation. See id. at 1315.
120. See supra note 73.
121. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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A scenarios into a best explanation,122 IBE is not the best explana-
tion of this situation. The standard probability formula is, because
the defense case put the entire probability space of causation on the
table, and the jury found that Pr(A) was not greater than 0.5.
Allen’s more recent iterations of Explanatory theory in collabora-
tion with Pardo attempt to shore up some of these descriptive
shortcomings by changing the theory to permit fact-finders to con-
sider unpresented explanations.123 This effort to be more catholic in
explaining formerly ill-fitting cases gains in descriptive accuracy,
but only at the cost of losing analytical crispness in distinguishing
itself from the standard Pr(A) > 0.5 account. The more unpresented
hypotheses we permit the jury to consider, the closer the sum of the
presented and unpresented hypotheses gets to 1.0, and the less
analytical benefit is derived from the IBE account in relation to the
standard probability account of Pr(A) > 0.5. The extreme example
would be the Reactin (Daubert) fact pattern, in which the defendant
relied on attacking the credibility of key plaintiff witnesses rather
than offering any sort of explanation of what happened. Again, that
defense invokes the infinity of unpresented alternative explanations
of plaintiff ’s injury.
To be fair, there is an unresolved “speculation problem” in ev-
idence law as a whole—there is no clear, consistent, or coherent
approach to when a jury can and cannot consider unpresented
hypotheses.124 Despite the common instruction to jurors not to “spec-
ulate,”125 the above examples show that they are often supposed to
do just that. IBE can hardly be faulted for failing to solve this prob-
lem, which evidence law has yet even to recognize. Nevertheless,
IBE’s ambiguity about unpresented explanations undercuts its prob-
abilistic solution to the conjunction paradox. IBE either increases
the risk of erroneous decision; bars defendants from presenting
disjunctive defenses, contrary to existing law; or allows use of
122. See, e.g., Pardo, supra note 84, at 599 (“General or disjunctive explanations may still
be the best available explanation.” (emphasis added)). “General explanations”? But see Pardo
& Allen, supra note 3, at 251 (“[T]he parties’ explicit theories at trial help to sort potential
explanations.” (emphasis added)).
123. To a vaguely defined extent. Without sufficient elaboration, they say that “fact-finders
are not limited to the potential explanations explicitly put forward by the parties, but may
construct their own.” Pardo & Allen, supra note 3, at 234.
124. See Schwartz, supra note 113, at 592-93.
125. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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unpresented explanations, thereby converging with the standard
Pr(A) > 0.5 account of burden of proof.126
D. Conclusion: Are the Cures Worse than the Disease?
To sum up, each of the proposed solutions to the conjunction prob-
lem are workarounds that drop one or more assumptions from the
5-assumption model by which the conjunction paradox is created.
Cohen and Clermont drop assumptions 1 and 2 by replacing the
standard rules of probability with something else.127 Expositors of
the element approach drop assumption 5, the “whole claim” condi-
tion.128 And proponents of IBE alter assumption 5 by dropping the
Pr(A) > 0.5 requirement, and perhaps dismissing probability theory
(assumptions 2 and 3) as well.129
It is not our aim to argue that any of the foregoing theories should
be rejected as theories of justified belief in the litigation system.
What we do claim, however, is that each of the theories has ex-
planatory problems and complexities that impose potential costs if
they were adopted in place of what we take to be the current pre-
vailing understanding: that the burdens of proof are meant to be
predetermined probability thresholds. Changing or dispensing with
the axioms of probability theory, or dropping the requirement that
a claimant prove his claim to a fixed probability threshold may re-
quire changing analytical or normative commitments whose nature
remains to be more fully explored. They may also require changes
to existing legal rules. For example, despite the claim by IBE
proponents that their explanatory theory tracks existing trial rules
and practice better than the standard Pr(A) > 0.5 account, the
126. Edward Cheng’s interesting attempt at solving the conjunction problem is also worth
noting. Cheng argues that the conjunction problem is solved by recasting the parties’ claims
as “probability ratios,” in which the plaintiff wins so long as the probability of his case is
greater than that of the defendant’s case. See Cheng, supra note 10, at 1259-62. We have not
discussed Cheng’s argument at length in the text here, because we read this argument as in
essence recasting the probabilistic solution of IBE in probability formulas: because the plain-
tiff can win without showing Pr(A) > 0.5, this permits plaintiff to win at least some claims
falling into the probability gap. It is subject to the same critique that we have made about the
IBE probabilistic solution. Curiously, IBE proponents have rejected Cheng’s helping hand. See
Allen & Stein, supra note 1, at 594-99 (attempting to refute Cheng’s argument).
127. See supra Part II.A.
128. See supra Part II.B.
129. See supra Part II.C.
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plurality of jurisdictions instruct their juries in terms consistent
with the Pr(A) > 0.5 account, and a smaller minority state that the
burden of proof is met by the stronger of the parties’ cases.130
In sum, there may be a large baby in the conjunction problem
bathwater. Perhaps these changes are worth making for various
reasons—but, as we will argue, solving the conjunction problem
should not be one of those reasons.
III. NARROWING THE “PROBABILITY GAP”: THE MULTIPLICATION
RULE FOR DEPENDENT EVENTS
In this Part, we examine assumption 3´ of the conjunction para-
dox: that the overall probability of the claim is the product of the
unconditional probabilities of the conjoint events. This assumption
presupposes that the elements of claims are probabilistically in-
dependent events, requiring application of the multiplication rule
for independent events. At least some evidence scholars in the past
have argued that this assumption is wrong, at least some of the
time; that the different multiplication rule for dependent events
should be applied to conjoint elements of claims; and that doing so
might resolve, or at least mitigate, the conjunction problem.131 But
that argument seems to have dropped out of the discussion of the
conjunction problem. Today, the conventional presentation of the
conjunction paradox applies the multiplication rule for probabil-
istically independent events, as we noted above in assumption 3´.132
130. Compare JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 200 (JUDICIAL
COUNCIL OF CAL. ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 2016) (“A party must
persuade you, by the evidence presented in court, that what he or she is required to prove is
more likely to be true than not true.”), with REVISED ARIZONA JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CIVIL,
Standard 2 (CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMM. OF THE STATE BAR OF ARIZ. 5th ed. 2015) (“On
any claim, the party who has the burden of proof must persuade you, by the evidence, that the
claim is more probably true than not true. This means that the evidence that favors that party
outweighs the opposing evidence.” (emphasis added)). The California instruction states the
Pr(A) > 0.5 standard in plain language. The Arizona instruction states that the better
explanation meets the burden of proof. Fewer than 40% of the jurisdictions we surveyed
adopted the latter comparative standard advocated by IBE. See David S. Schwartz & Elliott
Sober, Appendix: Conjunction-Problem v. Non-Conjunction-Problem Jurisdictions, 59 WM. &
MARY L. REV. ONLINE 33 (2017).
131. See Dawid, supra note 39, at 92 (acknowledging scenarios in which elements may not
be fully independent); Hamer, supra note 20, at 527-28 (same).
132. See Clermont, supra note 6, at 1108 (noting that “disputed elements might not be
really independent” in practice, but using the multiplication rule for independent events
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To be sure, probabilistic dependence fails to eliminate the con-
junction problem mathematically. Because the probabilities of the
elements are less than 1 under either product rule, the conjoint
probability of elements is always less than the original individual
probabilities.133 Given that probabilistic dependence does not elim-
inate the conjunction problem, many scholars are content to present
the problem using the wrong multiplication rule—for independent
events—to avoid what they see as undue presentational complex-
ity.134
Nevertheless, we believe that probabilistic dependence should be
restored to the conversation. In this Part we argue that, since most
elements of legal claims are probabilistically dependent, the mul-
tiplication rule for dependent events provides the proper analysis
for the conjunction problem. The conditional probabilities required
to be used in the multiplication rule for dependent events will typic-
ally have higher values than their unconditional counterparts. Since
their values will still be less than 1.0, their product will still be
diminished by adding more elements, and thus the probability gap
is not eliminated. But while probabilistic dependence does not by
itself eliminate the conjunction paradox, it does substantially nar-
row the “probability gap” that makes the conjunction paradox seem
like a big problem.
A. Probabilistic Dependence and Independence
1. Formal Definitions and Multiplication Rules
Probabilistic independence and dependence are formally defined
in probability theory as follows. Two events, A and B, are prob-
abilistically independent if and only if Pr(A|B) = Pr(A).135 That is to
anyway); Nesson, supra note 28, at 1389-90 (same).
133. See Cheng, supra note 10, at 1257 & n.5.
134. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 76, at 374 & n.4 (noting that elements of a cause of action
“will generally not be independent, but that simply makes the mathematics slightly more
complicated without affecting the analysis”); Cheng, supra note 10, at 1263 (“Although
probably not strictly true empirically, let’s presume both elements are statistically indepen-
dent to simplify the calculations.”); Clermont, supra note 6, at 1108 (presenting conjunction
problem as product of independent elements even though “disputed elements might not be
really independent” in practice).
135. HACKING, supra note 8, at 60.
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say, the probability of A given B (or A conditional on the truth of B)
equals the unconditional probability of A. In plain English, A and B
are probabilistically independent if the occurrence of event B has no
effect on the probability of the occurrence of event A. Probabilistic
independence can be defined equivalently as Pr(A|B) = Pr(A|not-B),
because the probability of A is the same whether B is true or false.136
The presence of B in the factual mix does not affect the probability
of A. It follows that events A and B are probabilistically dependent
if Pr(A|B)  Pr(A). In plain English, A and B are dependent events
if the occurrence of B affects the probability of the occurrence of
event A.
2. Logical v. Probabilistic Independence
There is a significant difference between probabilistic independ-
ence, on the one hand, and logical independence on the other.
Probabilistic independence has been defined above. Logical inde-
pendence is a related but different concept. “Propositions X and Y
are logically independent precisely when all four conjunctions of the
form ±X & ±Y are logically possible (i.e., non-contradictory).”137 The
statements “‘it is raining’ and ‘you are carrying an umbrella’ are
logically independent of each other”—you may be carrying an
umbrella, or not, whether it is raining or not.138 But “if you follow
the advice of accurate weather forecasts, these two propositions will
be probabilistically dependent on each other.”139 Moreover, if the two
propositions in question “are neither tautologies nor contradictions,”
then probabilistic independence implies logical independence, but
not the converse.140
Thus, logically independent propositions may be probabilistically
dependent, as in the umbrella/raining example above. This distinc-
tion may have confused some evidence theorists who, mistaking
logical independence for probabilistic independence, seem to have
greatly overstated the presence of independent elements in legal
136. See id. at 62.
137. ELLIOTT SOBER, OCKHAM’S RAZORS: A USER’S MANUAL 67 (2015). These are X and Y,
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claims. Consider that two logically independent events that seem
“clearly” to be probabilistically independent of each other may turn
out to be probabilistically dependent once additional facts are
brought to bear. Suppose event A is “the Denver Broncos win the
Super Bowl” and event B is “the Democratic candidate wins the next
presidential election.” Viewed one way, these events seem unrelated
and independent. But suppose a Broncos Super Bowl victory makes
a significant number of Colorado voters more satisfied with the
state of the world, causing them to vote to reelect the Democratic
incumbent, swinging a key state into the Democratic column. In
both the Broncos/Democrats and the umbrella/raining examples,
incorporated background facts render the logically independent
propositions probabilistically dependent.
3. The Multiplication Rules
In basic probability theory, the probability of two events A and B
occurring conjointly is their product: Pr(A & B) = Pr(A|B) · Pr(B).141
That is to say, the probability of A and B equals the conditional
probability of A given B times the unconditional probability of B.
This is the general rule, which is true whether A and B are inde-
pendent or dependent. If they are independent, the rule simplifies
to Pr(A & B) = Pr(A) · Pr(B). The simplification is made possible
because independence means that Pr(A|B) = Pr(A).142
When the question is the joint probability of three events, A, B,
and C, the probability of the conjoint occurrence is expressed by
Pr(A & B & C) = Pr(A|B & C) · Pr(B & C). This is the same formu-
lation of the original multiplication rule, in which the conjunction
B & C has taken the place of B in the original version. But note also
that Pr(A & B & C) = Pr(A|B & C) · Pr(B & C) = Pr(A|B & C) ·
Pr(B|C) · Pr(C).
This tells us that, where A, B, and C are mutually dependent
events, only the last probability is unconditional when using the
multiplication rule to determine their joint probability. But where
A, B, and C are independent, the conditional probabilities drop out:
Pr(A & B & C) = Pr(A) · Pr(B) · Pr(C).
141. HACKING, supra note 8, at 59.
142. Id. at 60.
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B. The Conjunction Paradox and the Assumption of Independence
By treating the multiplication rule for independent events as a
stand-in for the multiplication rule for dependent events, evidence
scholarship may have underestimated the impact of probabilistic
dependence on the conjunction problem in two ways. First, as we
will explain further in the next Section, conjunction problem schol-
arship tends to underestimate the degree of probabilistic dependence
of the elements. For example, the existence of a duty of care and the
breach of that duty are often presented as two elements, rather than
a single element.143 In that case, the existence of a duty given its
breach will be extremely high, approaching 1.0.144
Second, the scholarship underestimates the pervasiveness of de-
pendence of the elements.145 In contrast to statements treating
dependence as the exception, it is, we believe, the norm. Here, it is
possible that at least some scholars have confused probabilistic
independence with logical independence. Consider a two element
claim: X is the defendant’s negligent act toward the plaintiff, and
Y is the causation of damages to the plaintiff by the conduct. The
two are logically independent, because all four conjunctions of the
form ±X & ±Y are logically possible (that is, noncontradictory). It is
possible for the defendant to have breached a duty of care without
causing harm to the plaintiff, or the other way around. But the
two elements are probabilistically dependent: if the defendant did
in fact act negligently toward the plaintiff, the probability that the
defendant caused injury to the plaintiff is higher than it would be
without the negligence.146
Although identified by the law as a set of facts that “must” be
proven probably true for a claimant to meet his burden of persua-
sion, and expressed at a relatively high level of generality, the ele-
ments are nevertheless “facts of the case.” Intuitively, we should
expect the elements to be as interrelated as any other facts of the
case. While the intuitive idea of interrelatedness is not identical to
probabilistic dependence, it is close enough to make one wonder why
143. See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30 (W.
Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984).
144. See infra Part III.C.1.
145. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
146. See infra Part III.C.
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it would be assumed that elements of a claim are probabilistically
independent. For example, as will be explained further below, to say
that a defendant’s negligent conduct is probabilistically independent
of the plaintiff ’s damages implies that that negligent conduct has
no causal or evidentiary bearing on damages.147 Assuming proba-
bilistic independence as a starting point means that the plaintiff
has lost the claim at the outset. As Judge Cardozo famously put it
in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad, “negligence in the air, so to
speak, will not do.”148
The counterintuitive nature of assuming litigated facts to be
independent is even more pointed when we think about the actual
presentation of cases. The law requires a claimant to present a
detailed narrative in support of his claim that includes far more
case-specific factual assertions than the relatively small set of facts
comprising the “essential ... elements.”149 While the elements range
between two and ten for most claims, the number of detailed factual
assertions encompassed in the narrative may number in the dozens
or even hundreds.150 Each one of those factual assertions will have
its own probability, and the probability of the overall narrative will
be the product of these probabilities. If all these case-specific fact
assertions were probabilistically independent of each other, we
would have a far bigger conjunction problem on our hands than has
been recognized. That would mean, paradoxically, that the more
detailed the narrative presented in support of claim X, the less
probable it is that X is true! The conjunction paradox would thus be
made into an analogue of Zeno’s paradox of motion: no claim can
ever be logically proven unless each component fact (of which there
are an infinite number) is proven to a virtual certainty.151
147. See infra Part III.C.
148. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928) (quoting FREDERICK
POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTS 455 (11th ed. 1920)).
149. See David S. Schwartz, A Foundation Theory of Evidence, 100 GEO. L.J. 95, 129 (2011);
cf. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (explaining that an adequately pleaded cause
of action must contain sufficient detail to show more than a possibility of entitlement to re-
lief).
150. See Schwartz, supra note 149, at 129-32.
151. This is a matter of axiomatic probability theory and basic arithmetic. As we increase
the number of independent events, the conjoint probability approaches zero: the probability
of ten independent events of 80% probability occurring conjointly is less than 11%. To
counteract this tendency and thus maintain a relatively high level of probability—even the
greater than 50% threshold required to meet the civil burden of persuasion—the probability
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The solution to this paradox requires recognizing that detailed
facts that make up a claimant’s narrative of guilt or liability tend to
be probabilistically dependent. In fact, by virtue of the requirement
of relevance, all facts entailed by the offering party must change the
probability of other facts; the narrative is supposed to be a network
of facts relevant to one another, and irrelevant facts are to be ex-
cluded.152 The probability of evidentiary fact A given evidentiary fact
B is greater than without B: Pr(A|B) > Pr (A). Note that this state-
ment, which formularizes the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) 401
standard of relevance, defeats independence, which is defined as
Pr(A|B) = Pr(A). By definition, two facts relevant to one another are
probabilistically dependent.
It is also important to note that the conditional probabilities that
we must use in calculating the joint probabilities of these facts can
be much higher than the unconditional probabilities. The relevance
and factual interrelatedness of a persuasive story of liability is
likely to mean that all but the weakest link will have high condi-
tional probabilities. Consider a shaky eyewitness identification that
is corroborated by strong circumstantial evidence that the defendant
committed the crime. The unconditional probability of the eyewit-
ness’s testimony might be around 0.5, but its conditional probability
given the circumstantial evidence might approach 1.
C. The Probabilistic Dependence of Most Elements of Litigated
Claims
Elements of claims are not different from evidentiary facts for
purposes of determining dependence. Elements differ from eviden-
tiary facts in the sense that they are stated generically when
describing the substantive law. Nevertheless, elements of claims are
factual propositions, and they are proven in a specific case in terms
of case-specific evidentiary facts. In operation, elements share with
of the individual events must get closer and closer to 1 (that is, 100% certainty). In order for
an infinite number of multiplicands to multiply out to any number that does not asymp-
totically approach zero, the multiplicands must asymptotically approach 1. For example, for
the conjoint probability of four equally probable events to exceed 0.5, the probability of each
must be more than 84%; for ten such events, 93%; and for one-hundred such events, 99%. The
fourth root of 0.5  .841; the tenth root  0.933; the hundredth root  0.993.
152. See FED. R. EVID. 401.
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every other factual proposition the linguistic and logical property
that they can be subdivided into numerous subpropositions.
The simplest illustration of this point is found in the variable
formulations of negligence claims in the conjunction problem liter-
ature.153 A negligence claim might be stated as a single factual prop-
osition that “the defendant negligently injured the plaintiff.” But the
substantive law typically divides this proposition into four parts: (1)
the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care; (2) the defendant
breached that duty of care; (3) the plaintiff suffered damages; and
(4) the damages were caused by the defendant’s breach.154 This is
the standard hornbook litany “duty, breach, causation, damages.”155
Each of these propositions is an “event” within the meaning of
probability theory, and can be assigned a probability. But we might
combine “duty and breach” into a single element, “breach of duty” or
“fault.” Likewise, causation and damages can naturally be combined
into a single element. It is not surprising that discussions of the con-
junction problem use three- or two-element formulations of negli-
gence.156
Yet these semantic and syntactical reconfigurations do not re-
quire different evidence, and thus can hardly change the probability
of the whole. As Richard Friedman has explained, “Because the
redivision of the claim [into more elements] has not altered its
substance, the fact-finder’s assessment of the probability of the
truth of the entire claim cannot have changed.”157 If there is a 0.6
probability that the defendant negligently injured the plaintiff, that
probability is the same whether the claim is sent to the jury with
the foregoing four-, three-, or two-element instruction on negligence.
It is true that the four-element version of the negligence instruction
would call for the product of four multiplicands, and the two-ele-
ment version would call for only two; and the multiplicands in the
four-element version would have to reflect higher individual proba-
153. See, e.g., Spottswood, supra note 6, at 274-75.
154. E.g., 6 CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, JONES ON EVIDENCE § 51:17 (7th
ed. 2016).
155. See id. (describing three- and four-element versions of negligence); see also KEETON
ET AL., supra note 143, § 30 (describing a four-element version).
156. See, e.g., Cheng, supra note 10, at 1256 (illustrating a “conventional negligence claim”
consisting of three elements); Nance, supra note 20, at 1566 (illustrating a two-element
negligence claim).
157. Friedman, supra note 35, at 283.
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bilities than those in the two-element version to multiply out to 0.6.
What is not true, however, is the commonplace assertion that the
four-element negligence claim is therefore harder for the plaintiff to
prove than the two-element version.158 Where the profusion of ele-
ments is merely linguistic, and does not add previously unneeded
facts to prove the case, the multiplication rule creates no practical
problem of proof.
Even when the function of subdividing a claim into evidence is to
guarantee a certain degree of factual detail of the evidence—in es-
sence to require more evidence than in a less elaborate statement
of elements—much of the seeming resultant “probability gap” will
be obviated by probabilistic dependence. An examination of large
numbers of jury instructions shows that most elements of most
claims are probabilistically dependent.159 This can occur for at least
two related reasons: the elements entail one another, or the ele-
ments are relevant to one another in the FRE 401 sense, as we now
explain.
1. Overlapping or Shared Elements
Many claims are defined in terms of elements that overlap: they
entail other elements or have shared propositions. Consider the first
two elements of the four-element version of negligence:
158. See, e.g., Cheng, supra note 10, at 1257 (“[W]ith each additional element, the plaintiff
finds it increasingly difficult to win.”). We should be clear: what we are talking about are
linguistic formulations that subdivide the definition of a claim requiring a certain amount of
evidence to prove a certain overall probability. There will be cases where an additional
element does make the plaintiff ’s claim more difficult to win. In Virginia v. Black, for exam-
ple, the Supreme Court held that a statute making it a crime (1) to burn a cross (2) on the
property of another was unconstitutional unless a third element was added: (3) with intent
to intimidate. See 538 U.S. 343, 347-48, 362-64 (2003). There, the Court’s purpose was specif-
ically to make the claimant’s case more difficult to prove—the additional element required
additional evidence. See id. That is not an instance of linguisitic reformulation, but a change
in the substantive evidentiary requirements.
Nor are we talking about the potential for making the claimant’s case more difficult be-
cause an increase in elements might increase the likelihood of jury confusion. That may affect
probabilities, but not in the sense the conjunction problem contemplates. See supra note 27.
159. See infra Part IV.C.3.
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(A) Defendant owed plaintiff a duty of care.
(B) Defendant breached that duty of care.160
Breach and duty are hardly independent: a duty of care may exist
independently of a particular breach, but a breach cannot exist
without a duty; “breach” is shorthand for “breach of a duty of
care.”161 So the probability of duty given breach is very close to 1.0.
A full statement of the propositions entailed in “duty” and “breach”
would be as follows:
Proposition A: Defendant owed plaintiff a duty of care.
 
Proposition B: Defendant owed plaintiff a duty of care and
breached that duty.
The second element of negligence entails the first. This implies
probabilistic dependence in all cases where the facts are disputed.
Note, first of all, that propositions A and B are not logically inde-
pendent: it is not the case that all four conjunctions of the form ±A
and ±B are noncontradictory: not-A contradicts B. A and B cannot
be probabilistically independent, since logical independence is a
necessary condition of probabilistic independence.162 Conversely, if
two events are logically dependent, they are probabilistically de-
pendent.163
We can also demonstrate the probabilistic dependence of A and
B by proof, but we have to spell out the significance of “disputed
facts.” Standard formulations of modern probability theory entail
that probabilities of 0 and 1 are “sticky,” meaning that they are
not amenable to change in light of new evidence.164 Thus, while
probabilities of 0 and 1 are assigned to logical contradictions and
tautologies, respectively, they are generally excluded from real-
world probability assessments.165 The litigation system embraces
160. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 143, § 30.
161. See FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 154, § 51:17.
162. See supra Part III.A.2.
163. See supra Part III.A.2.
164. See SOBER, supra note 3, at 152.
165. See id.
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this understanding. An element of a claim may be assigned a
probability of 0 or 1 by a court (judgment as a matter of law), or may
be assigned a probability of 1 by the parties (a stipulated fact). But
these are defined as “undisputed facts.” Factual disputes assigned
to the jury are considered inherently uncertain: they are not expect-
ed to be resolved as 100% true or 100% false, and juries are expected
to assess probabilities based on evidence. Accordingly, disputed
facts will, by assumption, have probabilities greater than zero but
less than one. The proof is now quite simple:
If B entails A, then Pr(A|B) = 1 [by axiom],166
Pr(A) < 1 [by assumption],
therefore Pr(A|B) > Pr(A), which shows probabilistic depend-
ence.167
In the negligence example, it will be seen that the nesting or
entailment of elements into one another does not stop with breach.
The next element is causation, but “cause” in the sentence defining
negligence is a predicate that is inchoate—its meaning cannot be
fixed by a trier of fact—without a subject and an object. The subject
is proposition B, and the object is proposition D, damages.
Proposition C: The breach of the duty of care caused an
accident resulting in damages.
Proposition D: The plaintiff suffered damages from the breach
of the duty of care.
Causation in the air, so to speak, will not do either. Nor will the one
word “damages,” for element D is not satisfied by damages coming
from other causes.
166. See HACKING, supra note 8, at 60.
167. Note that if B entails A, the two could be independent by assigning A or B some combi-
nation of probabilities of 1 or 0. But a 0 probability ends the case under either multiplication
rule, while a 1 probability has no numerical impact on the product of the remaining elements.
Where the separate probabilities of the elements matter, elements that overlap or entail prior
elements are probabilistically dependent.
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2. Mutually Relevant Elements
As we showed above, the definition of probabilistic dependence is
identical to the definition of relevance in the FRE. Evidence B is
relevant to consequential fact A if B changes the probability of A. In
other words, the definition of relevant evidence, Pr(A|B)  Pr(A),
contradicts the definition of probabilistic independence, Pr(A|B) =
Pr(A). This applies equally to elements of the case, which are, after
all, factual propositions. Any elements connected to one another as
potentially relevant evidence are probabilistically dependent.
A recurring illustration of this is the concept of causation of dam-
ages, or more generally, “harm.” The elements of virtually all civil
cases include a requirement that the defendant’s conduct (or some
agent for whose conduct the defendant is legally responsible) caused
some type of harm to the plaintiff.168 The structure of this claim
asserts that conduct A caused harm B. Generally speaking, factual
propositions of this “A causes B ” structure imply that A and B are
probabilistically dependent.169 In the litigation context, it is easy to
see that a civil wrong, such as a tort or breach of contract, increases
the probability that the recipient of that wrongful conduct suffered
damages. The reverse is also true: where a person has suffered in-
jury, the probability of misconduct by an identifiable perpetrator
acting on that person is at least slightly increased. This is intuitive:
breaches of duties of care tend to cause injuries, breaches of contract
tend to cause financial losses, etc.
It would be difficult to identify many civil or criminal claims that
do not have this type of probabilistic dependence as to some of the
elements at least. In an armed robbery case, the elements might be
(1) the taking of property by means of, (2) force or threat, (3) while
using a weapon.170 Facts showing the threat will also tend to show
the use of the weapon, and vice versa. Facts showing the taking of
property will be relevant to show the threat, and vice versa. In all
such instances where the elements have a tendency to assist in
168. See, e.g., supra Part III.C.I.
169. We say “generally speaking” because examples can be constructed in which this con-
dition fails to be satisfied. See, e.g., Austin Frakt, Causation Without Correlation Is Possible,
INCIDENTAL ECONOMIST (Dec. 16, 2009, 4:00 AM), http://theincidentaleconomist.com/
wordpress/causation-without-correlation-is-possible/ [https://perma.cc/YZ9L-F2X4].
170. See 77 C.J.S. Robbery § 3 (2017).
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proving one another—to make one another more probable—the
elements of the claim are probabilistically dependent.
D. Applying the Proper Multiplication Rule
It is easy to see how correcting the error of assumption 3´ can
significantly narrow the appearance of a “probability gap.” In the
multiplication rule for dependent events, only the last probability is
unconditional.171 Thus, for example, with three interdependent
events, essential elements A, B and C, the following formula applies:
Pr(A & B & C) = Pr(A|B & C) · Pr(B & C) = Pr(A|B & C) · Pr(B|C)
· Pr(C). The conditional probability of one element given another
will be higher than the unconditional probability of that element
and as a practical matter is often quite high. It may even be close to
1. Only the last element will be represented by an unconditional
probability. Consider the two-element version of negligence: if the
conditional probability of fault given causation were 95%, an
unconditional probability for causation of just over 52.63% is all that
is arithmetically required for the product to exceed 0.5.
To repeat, we do not claim to have solved or eliminated the con-
junction paradox. The probability of the whole claim will always be
less than the lowest unconditional probability.172 But we do believe
171. An extra unconditional probability will have to be multiplied in cases where there is
a probabilistically independent element. We suggest that most claims involve probabilistically
dependent elements, though we don’t claim to have exhaustively canvassed the entire world
of civil and criminal claims. We are aware of one recurring category of claims that include a
probabilistically independent element: certain status offenses and perhaps claims with a
jurisdictional element. For example, the two elements of the crime of felon in possession of a
gun are (1) possession of a gun, and (2) by a person convicted of a felony. See 79 AM. JUR. 2D
Weapons and Firearms § 26 (2017). These appear to be probabilistically independent. The
same point might be raised about the jurisdictional element in the federal version of this
crime. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for any person ... who has been
convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year
... [to] possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm.”). Vicarious liability may be another
example: proof that a tortfeasor was employed by the defendant seems to be probabilistically
independent of the elements of negligence, causation, and damages.
These exceptions do not significantly affect the main point. The majority of litigated claims
do not involve these elements, and many statuses, such as a felony conviction, are easily
proven to a high degree of probability. And in a vicarious liability case where the status and
the tort both carry high degrees of doubt falling just shy of 0.5, one has to wonder why it is
problematic to find for the defendant.
172. See, e.g., Cheng, supra note 10, at 1257. We say the “lowest unconditional probability”
instead of the unconditional probability of the last element because probability theory is
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we have shown that the conventional presentation of the con-
junction paradox greatly overstates the appearance of a “proba-
bility gap.”
IV. THE NATURE OF THE JURY FUNCTION
The probability gap is not a theoretical problem, or a paradox. It
is merely an atmospheric that sustains an illogical intuition that
separate probabilities of elements should not have to be higher than
the probability of the overall claim. What makes the conjunction
problem paradoxical is the conflict between assumptions 4b and 5.
4b. Proving that the probability of each separate element ex-
ceeds the probability threshold established by the applicable
burden of proof is a sufficient condition for the claimant to win
the claim.
5. If the probability of the overall claim is greater than the
probability threshold established by the applicable burden of
proof, the claimant should win the claim; otherwise she should
lose.
Assumption 4b, whatever its source as an idea, appears to be in-
terjected into trial decision-making by jury instructions.173 In this
Part we argue that the legal foundation of assumption 4b is am-
biguous. Few jurisdictions in the United States instruct their jurors
to find for the claimant based on meeting an “each element”
condition.174 The language of most jury instructions can be read to
harmonize assumptions 4 and 5 by incorporating assumption 4a
rather than 4b—proving each element to the probability threshold
is a necessary but not sufficient condition for finding guilt or lia-
bility.175 The purpose of isolating the elements may not be to require
fact-finders to determine conditional probabilities, or to multiply
indifferent to the order in which the elements are stated. The conditional and unconditional
probabilities must multiply out to the same product whichever order they appear in the
formula. We explain this further in Part IV.
173. See, e.g., Allen & Jehl, supra note 15, at 897-904.
174. See infra Part IV.C.3.
175. See infra Part IV.C.3.
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conditional or unconditional ones, but rather to run a simple test on
the probability of the overall claim—a test we call an “entailment
check.” However, special verdict forms introduce an additional layer
of ambiguity into the mix.
A. Why Do We Have “Each Element” Jury Instructions?
At the end of the day, a claimant is required to prove a conjunc-
tion, a narrative consisting of numerous facts at some level of detail.
The claim is in fact a unique narrative of liability—unique not in
the sense of “unusual,” but in the sense of particular. The elements
of claims are generic, not unique. When we ask a claimant to “prove
negligence,” we do not mean that the claimant should demonstrate
that the legal system’s general idea of negligence is defined as
“breach of a duty of care, causing damages.” Rather, the plaintiff is
to prove a unique instance in which negligence happened to him.
The claim is manifestly the focal point of the inquiry, not the
elements. Surely, whatever objections may be made to IBE, this is
one insight IBE expositors have gotten right: the claim is first and
foremost a case-specific explanation incorporating the legal ele-
ments, whose overall probability is determinative.176
So why do we have jury instructions that direct attention to “each
element”? The primary reason has to be to ensure “narrative fit”
between the claimant’s story and the implicit narrative built into
the substantive law.
The legal narrative is reduced to a checklist of “elements” ... that
must be present in order for legal consequences to be imposed as
a result of the particular occurrence. This “element” requirement
is not unlike a screenwriting rule that a “romantic comedy” must
have the elements “boy meets girl, they fall in love, they fall out
briefly, and they end up together when the boy makes a moving
speech after running or driving some great distance to find the
girl.”177
176. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
177. Schwartz, supra note 149, at 132. Aside from the regrettably hetero-centric quality of
the definition, have we misidentified the elements of romantic comedy? Maybe so. Perhaps
Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid fits the definition of a rom-com: two outlaws meet, fall
in love, start a relationship as train- and bank-robbing accomplices, have a falling out, recon-
cile and reunite—and die together in a hail of bullets. See BUTCH CASSIDY AND THE SUNDANCE
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The jury instructions tell the jury to examine the elements of the
case to determine whether the claimant has proven a claim that fits
the negligence “genre” established by the substantive law.
B. The “Each Element” Instruction as an Entailment Check
Jury instructions are not directing juries to find for the claimant
when the probability threshold has been reached for each element.
Nor are they directing juries to multiply the probabilities they do
find. What, then, is their function? Here, we elaborate on Nance’s
insight that the “each element” condition (assumption 4a) functions
“simply to remind the jury that a failure by the plaintiff to suffi-
ciently prove any element of the plaintiff ’s case will relieve the jury
of further deliberations on the other elements.”178 Nance is right,
though we think there is more to it than a simple reminder.
If a civil claim has essential elements A, B, and C, then the over-
all probability of the plaintiff ’s case is formulated as: Pr(A & B & C)
= Pr(A|B & C) · Pr(B & C) = Pr(A|B & C) · Pr(B|C) · Pr(C). We
have suggested that instructions do not ask the jury to determine
these conditional probabilities, let alone multiply them. That seems
to be asking a lot. As we have seen, even evidence scholars them-
selves have for many years shied away from doing so.179
KID (Twentieth Century Fox 1969). You could make a case—the film has some laughs in it.
This problem arises in the law all the time. The elements of murder might be defined as (1)
the premeditated killing of another person (2) without justification. See 40 AM. JUR. 2D
Homicide § 36 (2017). These two elements suggest a core or “garden variety” narrative that
looks quite different from a case in which a doctor administers a lethal dose of morphine to
a pain-stricken, terminally ill cancer patient. But the doctor could well be charged with
murder. See T. Howard Stone & William J. Winslade, Physician-Assisted Suicide and
Euthanasia in the United States, 16 J. LEGAL MED. 481,484 (1995) (“A physician who commits
euthanasia may be criminally charged with the patient’s homicide in virtually any state
because the physician has purposely and directly caused the patient’s death.”). The un-
certainty about the fit between the doctor’s specific-alleged-murder narrative and the core
narrative of murder and its essential elements will be resolved either by a legal ruling or by
a probabilistic jury decision. A judge might dismiss the case as a matter of law, in essence
holding that the case-specific narrative does not include all the essential elements of murder.
Or the judge might make a legal ruling that assisted suicide is not a justification in a case of
murder. Or the judge might decline to define “justification,” and instead leave the jury to
decide whether physician-assisted suicide is, beyond a reasonable doubt, an insufficient justif-
ication for a premeditated killing.
178. Nance, supra note 18, at 950.
179. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
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Let’s assume a case involving excessive force by a police officer,
and assign each of the three elements a place in the above formula:
A = unreasonable force, B = causation, and C = compensable dam-
ages. If the legal system insisted on juries conducting a multiplica-
tion exercise to determine the probability of plaintiff ’s excessive
force claim, it would have to multiply: Pr(A|B & C) · Pr(B|C) ·
Pr(C). In words, we would be asking a jury to find and multiply the
(conditional) probability of unreasonable force given causation and
damages, the (conditional) probability of causation given damages,
and the (unconditional) probability of damages.
But as a matter of probability theory, we have arbitrarily as-
signed elements to the letters A, B, and C in the formula. The mul-
tiplication rule is indifferent to which event is assigned which place
in the formula. We could as easily have formulated the probabilities
in the claim as the conditional probability of damages given cau-
sation and unreasonable force, times the conditional probability of
causation given unreasonable force, times the unconditional prob-
ability of unreasonable force. Perhaps we want the jury to do both,
as well as the other possible combinations.
This aspect of the problem gives us a hint at its solution. The fact
is that we do not actually expect the jury to find and multiply these
probabilities. The “each element” jury instruction directs a quite
different, more intuitive, and ultimately easier probabilistic oper-
ation. We call that operation an “entailment check.”
We can start with the intuition that unconditional probabilities
are easier to describe and estimate than conditional ones. To be
sure, that assumption has been debated, and we do not base it on
psychometric authority. But this assumption seems to be widely
shared by evidence scholars who have discussed the conjunction
problem: hence, the marked tendency in the literature to present
the conjunction problem in terms of unconditional probabilities to
“simplify” matters.180 Certainly, it is true by definition that an un-
conditional probability is assessed in isolation from the probabilities
of other events, which may simplify them in practice.
As noted above, the multiplication rule for probabilistically de-
pendent events requires the finding of one unconditional probabil-
ity; in our three-element example, this was Pr(C). And, as noted
180. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
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above, we could run the formula three different times, assigning a
different essential element to the place of C each time. Axiomati-
cally, the total probability Pr(A & B & C) = Pr(C & B & A). This is
because the two conjunctions are logically equivalent and the
axioms of probability entail that logically equivalent propositions
must have the same probability.181 There are actually six different
ordering combinations.182 Running all six variations of the formula
means that each element—unreasonable force, causation, and
damages—will have its turn (two turns, in fact) occupying the C
position, the one assessed as an unconditional probability.
The “each element” instruction asks the jury to examine the ele-
ments for compliance with the doctrine of entailment (also known
as the doctrine of logical consequence). As we have seen, seemingly
simple statements can be shown to be equivalent to a conjunction.183
The initial proposition is said to “entail” the conjuncts in the
conjunction and cannot be more probable than any of the entailed
components. If fact B entails fact A, the probability of B is less than
or equal to the probability of A.184 This is a corollary of the two
multiplication rules. The factual assertion “he arrived at the airport
on time” entails “he arrived at the airport,” and thus the probability
that “he arrived at the airport on time” cannot be greater than the
probability that “he arrived at the airport (at all).” By requiring
“essential elements,” the substantive law tells us that a case-specific
story of guilt or liability must entail case-specific versions of certain
generic facts—for example, breach of a duty of care. By requiring
that each element be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, the
jury is instructed to check to make sure that each required fact is
present at a level of certainty that meets the burden of persuasion.
If any required fact falls below that level, then, under the doctrine
of entailment, the entire story of guilt or liability falls below that
level—since the entire story cannot be more probable than its least
probable entailed fact.
181. See HACKING, supra note 8, at 58; see also Friedman, supra note 35, at 283 (“Because
the redivision of the claim [into more elements] has not altered its substance, the fact-finder’s
assessment of the probability of the truth of the entire claim cannot have changed.”).
182. A-B-C, A-C-B, B-A-C, B-C-A, C-A-B, and C-B-A.
183. See supra Part III.C.
184. HACKING, supra note 8, at 60.
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Thus, the “each element” form of jury instruction fulfills two
important functions, neither of which requires the jury to multiply
probabilities or determine conditional probabilities of separate
elements. First, as explained above, the listing of elements ensures
that the facts deemed essential to a particular claim are all pres-
ent.185 Second, the requirement that each element be proven to the
burden-of-proof probability threshold provides a useful test on
whether the overall claim meets the threshold. If one or more ele-
ments falls below the probabilistic floor, then the entire claim
fails—according to the multiplication rule or its corollary, the
doctrine of entailment. 
True, the entailment check is a test that demonstrates only the
failure of proof: passing the entailment check does not demonstrate
that the claim as a whole has met the burden of proof. That requires
either instructions to the jury to consider the probability of the
overall “claim,” or perhaps in some jurisdictions reliance on jurors’
intuitions to consider whole claims. The entailment check embodied
in jury instructions is merely an important, though imperfect prob-
abilistic test of that overall finding.
In sum, the entailment check confirms the idea that meeting the
probability threshold for the burden of proof for each element is a
necessary but not sufficient condition for the claimant to win the
claim. Pass the test, and the jury may find for the claimant. Fail the
test, and the jury cannot find for the claimant.
C. What Do Jury Instructions Actually Say?
As noted above, it is not probability theory, but rather the set of
decision rules given to fact-finders by the legal system, that creates
the conjunction problem. This makes it important to attend to what
jury instructions actually say. To that end, we have undertaken a
survey of pattern jury instructions from fifty-five jurisdictions, both
states and federal circuits, in civil and criminal cases. Our method-
ology is explained below,186 and the data are summarized in an
Appendix to the Article.187 Overall, we found that jury instructions
185. See Schwartz, supra note 149, at 132.
186. See infra Part IV.C.1.
187. The Appendix is published at David S. Schwartz & Elliott Sober, Appendix:
Conjunction-Problem v. Non-Conjunction-Problem Jurisdictions, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV.
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replicated the conjunction problem in fewer than one-fourth of the
jurisdictions in civil cases, and one-third in criminal cases.188 These
jurisdictions replicated the conjunction problem by instructing
juries to find for the claimant when the burden of proof has been
met as to each element separately. But the majority of jurisdictions
implied that juries should, or at least could, treat the satisfaction of
the “each element” condition as necessary but not sufficient to find
for the claimant. These jurisdictions are thus consistent with our
“entailment check” explanation.189 However, even in these latter
jurisdictions consistent with the entailment check explanation, the
reliance on special verdict forms introduces a further ambiguity;
special verdict forms can be understood to direct a finding for the
claimant where the “each element” condition has been met.190
It is important here to note the limits of our contentions. We are
not claiming that jury instructions mostly “get it right,” or that they
are for the most part free of errors in the way they present proba-
bilistic reasoning. Nor are we claiming that jury instructions
consistent with our entailment check explanation of the elements-
claims relationship have been consciously designed to make jury
decision-making conform to probability theory and the multiplica-
tion rule. Nance is undoubtedly correct when he surmises that few,
if any, jury instructions have been written as self-conscious efforts
to incorporate the multiplication rule for conjunctions.191 What we
do claim is that the actual practice of jury instructions, as far as our
survey reveals it, fails to demonstrate a systematic breakdown of
jury decision-making stemming from a conjunction problem. Jury
instructions can be presented in a way that obviates the conjunc-
tion problem, and many actually are. But we reserve a discussion of
the normative question—whether jury instruction practice should
be reformed to obviate any trace of the conjunction problem—for the
last Section.
ONLINE 33 (2017).
188. See infra Part IV.C.1.
189. See infra Part IV.C.3.
190. See infra Part IV.C.4.
191. See NANCE, supra note 20, at 77.
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1. Methodology and Interpretations
In our survey, we examined state-by-state and federal circuit-by-
circuit pattern jury instructions from fifty-five jurisdictions (forty-
seven states and eight federal circuits) that were readily available
from online sources.192 All the jurisdictions separate civil and crim-
inal jury instructions, and some jurisdictions had only civil or only
criminal instructions. This approach yielded data from forty-one
states and six federal circuits in civil cases, and thirty-seven states
and eight federal circuits for criminal cases.193 Although this data
therefore has some obvious limitations, we judged that it was ade-
quate to the present task, and we doubt whether there is sufficient
additional information to be gleaned that would warrant the im-
mense research effort involved in an exhaustive survey.194
For each jurisdiction, we examined the instructions to detect the
presence of the “each element” and “whole claim” conditions. We
asked: did the instructions say that meeting the burden of proof as
to each element was a necessary or sufficient condition, and did the
instructions indicate a requirement that the entire claim meet the
burden of proof? In each jurisdiction’s instructions, we looked in
two places for this information. First, we examined the general in-
structions on the burden of proof, which typically address elements
and claims generically.195 Second, we sampled substance-specific
instructions, which list the elements of specific civil claims and
criminal charges, to see whether these also gave directions about
applying the burden of proof to elements and whole claims. Our
192. This count of forty-seven states includes the District of Columbia.
193. See Schwartz & Sober, supra note 130.
194. All data gathering involves choices and compromises, and this survey is no exception.
States and federal circuits are missing from our survey either because they fail to issue
pattern jury instructions, make their pattern instructions available only to members of the
state bar, or require the payment of a fee to obtain them. Further, the reliance on pattern
instructions itself represents a compromise of sorts in data gathering. Pattern jury instruc-
tions are not binding on trial courts in all jurisdictions, and there may be significant variation
in practice as to the extent to which they are used in the exact form presented. Appellate
decisions in a jurisdiction might provide a more accurate picture of what jury instructions are
actually used—or they might not. Because not all jury instructions will find their way into
appellate case law, and because appellate decisions are notoriously incomplete as descriptions
of trial-level practice for a variety of reasons, even that monumental research undertaking is
likely to be nonexhaustive.
195. See Schwartz & Sober, supra note 130.
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analysis thus fills a gap in the existing debate over whether jury
instructions replicate the conjunction problem: prior analyses did
not systematically look at the linguistic interaction between the
general and specific instructions, and thereby may have missed
important information about the relationship between the burden
of proof as to claims and elements.
Our inquiry shows a wide variation in how jurisdictions instruct
juries on burdens of proof. But it confirms the conclusion in earlier
scholarship based on more limited surveys that jury instructions
do not for the most part reproduce the conjunction problem.196 We
detected six distinct patterns in these instructions. Two patterns
replicate the conjunction problem in that they direct juries to find
for the claimant when the burden of proof has been met as to each
separate element (assumption 4b). One of these two patterns rep-
licates the conjunction problem explicitly, by including assumption
5 (instructing juries to base findings on whole claims) along with
assumption 4b, while the other does so only implicitly, by including
assumption 4b but omitting assumption 5.197
The remaining four patterns, comprising the great majority of
jurisdictions, fail to replicate the conjunction problem because they
do not clearly include assumption 4b in their instructions. Several
jurisdictions expressly incorporate assumptions 4a and 5: they in-
struct their juries to apply the burden of proof to both whole claims
and elements, but do not require finding for the claimant when the
burden of proof has been met as to the elements. A fourth pattern,
which we refer to as “aggregate elements,” is found in jurisdictions
that incorporate assumption 4b while implying—albeit ambigu-
ously—assumption 5: they break down claims into elements and
instruct their juries to find for claimants who meet the burden of
proof on “all” the elements. This is the instructional pattern that
Nance found to be ambiguous198 but consistent with what we are
calling the entailment check.199 A fifth pattern incorporates as-
sumption 4a only, instructing juries to apply the burden of proof to
each separate element, without requiring a finding for the claimant
where the “each element” condition has been met. This pattern is
196. See Levmore, supra note 65, at 724 & n.1; Nance, supra note 20, at 1571-72, 1572 n.69.
197. See infra Part IV.C.2.
198. See Nance, supra note 20, at 1571-72.
199. See supra Part IV.B.
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consistent with the entailment check if one assumes that juries
naturally tend to decide whole claims unless instructed otherwise.
Finally, the sixth pattern treats claims holistically, in essence in-
corporating assumption 5 while not including either assumption 4a
or 4b. In our view, this pattern fails to replicate the conjunction
problem, although it does not replicate the entailment check either.
The breakdown showing the number of jurisdictions for each of
these six patterns, separated by civil and criminal cases, is pre-
sented in Table 1. The bottom line is that the conjunction problem
appears in only eleven of forty-seven jurisdictions in civil cases, and
fifteen of forty-five jurisdictions in criminal cases.
























Civil 1 10 11 18 5 9 4 36
Criminal 9 6 15 21 4 1 4 30
Total 10 16 26 39 9 10 8 66
The distinction between the conjunction-problem and non-con-
junction-problem jurisdictions required us to make an interpretive
choice about a linguistic ambiguity that pervades the English lan-
guage. As linguists have observed, the terms “each,” “every,” “each
and every,” “any,” and “all” have overlapping meanings, and their
use in legal instruments is ambiguous in many contexts.200 Nance
pointed to this type of ambiguity in his essay launching the debate
over whether jury instructions in fact replicated the conjunction
problem.201 According to Nance, instructions that require juries to
200. See 2 JOHN LYONS, SEMANTICS 454-59 (1977); see also Nance, supra note 18, at 949
(describing possible interpretations of a federal jury instruction).
201. See Nance, supra note 18, at 949.
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find for the claimant who meets the burden of proof on “all” or even
“every” element, could be read to mean that juries should base their
findings on whole claims.202 Allen and Jehl subsequently disputed
this point, arguing that the “each/every/all” ambiguity was cleared
up by further instructions.203 Either juries are directed to find for
the defendant if “any” element was not proven, or they are in-
structed to find for the claimant where each element had been
proven to the probability threshold.204
We have decided to split the difference between these two views.
On the one hand, we agree with Nance that Allen and Jehl’s ref-
utation is unpersuasive. Instructing juries to find for the defendant
by the failure of proof on “any” element merely demonstrates that
proving “each” element is a necessary condition, not that it is a suf-
ficient condition.205 And instructing juries that they must find for
the claimant when the burden of proof has been met for each
element tells us nothing about whether “every” or “all” mean “each
separate one” or “all together.” Nevertheless, the words “each” and
“every” in most of the jury instructions strike us as more naturally
understood to mean “each separate one,” rather than “all together,”
and we have categorized the instructions accordingly. However,
where an instruction indicates that a finding is based on meeting
the burden of proof as to “all” elements, we have treated that in-
struction as suggestive of the “all together” interpretation.
2. Conjunction-Problem Jurisdictions
The conjunction problem arises expressly in jury instructions that
state both that the claimant wins by proving each element to the
probability threshold (assumption 4b), and that the claimant wins
by proving his overall claim to the probability threshold (assump-
tion 5).206 Because of the multiplication rule for conjunctions, such
instructions, scrupulously followed, are likely to produce cases in
which the “each element” and “whole claim” decision rules require
conflicting results. Surprisingly, we found only one jurisdiction
202. See id. at 949-52. 
203. See Allen & Jehl, supra note 15, at 897-904.
204. See id.
205. See Nance, supra note 20, at 1567.
206. See supra Part II.B.
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employing such instructions in civil cases. The District of Columbia
instructs that “[t]he party who makes a claim ... has the burden of
proving it. This burden of proof means that the plaintiff must prove
every element of [his/her] claim by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.”207 This general instruction by itself is ambiguous, though
based on our judgment call treating “every” to mean “every one
separately,” it suggests a conjunction problem. But when instructing
on individual causes of action, the District of Columbia makes the
conjunction problem more explicit:
[Plaintiff] alleges that [Defendant] was negligent and is liable
for [Plaintiff ’s] harm. A negligence claim has three elements:
1. [Defendant] did not use ordinary care;
2. [Defendant’s] failure to use ordinary care caused [Plain-
tiff’s] harm; and
3. [Plaintiff] is entitled to damages as compensation for that
harm.
[Plaintiff] must prove each element by a preponderance of the
evidence—that each element is more likely so than not so. If
[Plaintiff] proves each element, your verdict must be for [Plain-
tiff]. If [Plaintiff] does not prove each element, your verdict must
be for [Defendant].208
The italicized language treats such proof of the elements as a
sufficient condition for the plaintiff to win: that is, meeting the con-
dition obligates the jury to find for the plaintiff.
This does not exhaust the conjunction problem, however. Several
jurisdictions—seven in civil and six in criminal instructions—direct
juries to find for the claimant when the burden of proof has been
met as to each separate element, without giving any whole claim
instruction. In other words, they instruct on assumption 4b while
omitting assumption 5. These jurisdictions—which we call “ele-
ments only, mandatory”—thus do not create an explicit conflict be-
tween elements-only and whole-claim decision rules. But we think
they are best understood as replicating the conjunction problem
for two reasons. First, one discussed aspect of the conjunction
207. STANDARDIZED CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA § 2.04 (CIVIL
JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMM. rev. ed. 2017).
208. Id. § 5.01 (emphasis added).
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problem is that jurors might well impose liability or guilt where the
“elements only” condition has been met but the probability of the
whole claim falls short of the burden of proof threshold. If that hap-
pens, that is indeed problematic. Second, it is widely believed that
jurors will impose a whole claim condition (assumption 5) on them-
selves unless expressly instructed not to (and perhaps even then).
These mandatory “elements only” jurisdictions typically give gen-
eral instructions that define the burden of proof as applying to
“elements” or “propositions” rather than “claims,” such as this used
in Illinois:
When I say that a party has the burden of proof on any proposi-
tion, or use the expression “if you find,” or “if you decide,” I mean
you must be persuaded, considering all the evidence in the case,
that the proposition on which he has the burden of proof is more
probably true than not true.209
The Illinois instructions then include this mandatory language after
listing the substantive elements of a claim: “If you find from your
consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions
has been proved, then your verdict should be for the plaintiff.”210 A
handful of jurisdictions propound elements-only civil instructions
differently, by incorporating element-by-element special verdict
forms directly into their definitions of the burden of proof.211
In criminal cases, conjunction problem instructions are more com-
mon than in civil cases. Nine jurisdictions define their burden of
proof in a manner suggesting that a conviction requires meeting the
“beyond a reasonable doubt” standard for the charge as a whole, and
then proceed to direct the jury—either in the general instruction or
in the instruction on a specific substantive charge—to convict if
“each element” has been proven. For example, Idaho instructs
209. ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CIVIL § 21.01 (SUPREME COURT COMM. ON
JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL CASES 2017).
210. Id. § 21.02.
211. See TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES—CIVIL § 200.3 (STATE BAR COMM. ON PATTERN
JURY CHARGES 2016) (“After the closing arguments, you will go to the jury room to decide the
case, answer the questions that are attached, and reach a verdict.... Answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to all
questions unless you are told otherwise. A ‘yes’ answer must be based on a preponderance of
the evidence.”); see also Schwartz & Sober, supra note 130, at 38-40 (showing similar practice
by Minnesota, Mississippi, and Wisconsin).
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generally that “the state must prove the alleged crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.”212 But it then gives mandatory elements-only
substantive instructions: “If you find that elements one(1)-five(5)
above have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, ... you must find
the defendant guilty of first degree murder.”213 Pennsylvania rep-
licates the conjunction problem in a single sentence by instructing
generally that “it is the Commonwealth that always has the burden
of proving each and every element of the crime charged and that the
defendant is guilty of that crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”214 Six
other jurisdictions follow the “elements only” pattern, typically
defining the burden of proof as a requirement applying only to
elements, and then requiring the jury to convict on proof of each
element. For example, Virginia instructs generally that juries must
“find the defendant not guilty unless and until the Commonwealth
proves each and every element of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt”215—which could be read as a permissive elements-only
instruction. But after listing the substantive elements of specific
crimes, Virginia instructs, “If you find from the evidence that the
Commonwealth has proved beyond a reasonable doubt each of the
above elements of the crime as charged, then you shall find the
defendant guilty.”216
3. Non-Conjunction-Problem Jurisdictions
The majority of jurisdictions use pattern jury instructions that
avoid the conjunction problem by omitting assumption 4b. That
is, they treat the elements as necessary but not sufficient condi-
tions to find for the claimant, expressly or implicitly implementing
the whole claim condition, assumption 5. A handful of jurisdictions
treat claims holistically and do not purport to apply the burden of
proof to separate elements. In all, thirty-six out of forty-seven
212. IDAHO CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS No. 103 (CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMM.
2010) (emphasis added).
213. Id. No. 704A (emphasis added).
214. PENNSYLVANIA SUGGESTED STANDARD CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 7.01 (CRIMI-
NAL JURY INSTRUCTION COMM. 2016) (emphasis added).
215. VIRGINIA MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CRIMINAL No. 2.100 (SUPREME COURT OF VA.
MODEL JURY INSTRUCTION COMM. 2016).
216. Id. No. G4.100.
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jurisdictions use civil instructions, and thirty out of forty-five use
criminal instructions, that avoid the conjunction problem.
Of the sixty-six sets of jury instructions that avoid the conjunc-
tion problem, most follow a pattern that is consistent with our
“entailment check” interpretation. That is to say, they include an
express or implicit “whole claim” condition, use language suggesting
that the “each element” condition is necessary to find for the
claimant, and omit language suggesting that the “each element”
condition requires a finding for the claimant.
We have identified eighteen jurisdictions as using “entailment
check” pattern in civil instructions and twenty-one in criminal in-
structions. This total of thirty-nine makes the entailment check the
clear plurality pattern. Most entailment check instructions refer to
the “claim,” “case,” or “charge” when defining the general burden of
proof, implying that the burden of proof applies to the whole claim,
and then go on to simply list the elements of specific substantive
claims or offenses without suggesting that establishing the elements
requires a finding for the plaintiff. For example, whole claim in-
structions might say “[p]laintiff ... has the burden of proving her
case by a preponderance of the evidence,”217 or “[t]he party who as-
serts a claim has the burden of proving it by a fair preponderance
of the evidence.”218 When coupled with instructions that list ele-
ments without directing a finding for the claimant, these are consis-
tent with the entailment check. Some jury instructions simply state
the claimant must prove “each,” or “each and every,” or sometimes
“all” of “the following elements.”219 The Fifth Circuit, for example,
introduces the substantive elements of a crime this way: “For you to
find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that
217. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL CASES) § 3.2 (COMM. ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUC-
TIONS DIST. JUDGES ASS’N FIFTH CIRCUIT 2016) (emphasis added).
218. CONNECTICUT JUDICIAL BRANCH CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 3.2-1 (CIVIL JURY INSTRUC-
TION COMM. 2008) (emphasis added); INDIANA MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 109 (IND.
JUDGES ASS’N 2016) (“Plaintiff must prove ... her ... claims by the greater weight of the evi-
dence.”).
219. See, e.g., ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CIVIL § 203 (ARK. SUPREME COURT
COMM. ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CIVIL 2016); JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS § 303 (JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL. ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL JURY INSTRUC-
TIONS 2016); IDAHO CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 2.10.3 (CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMM. 2003);
MISSISSIPPI MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CIVIL § 10:8 (MISS. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS
COMM’N 2012); OKLAHOMA CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS—§ 3.1 (OKLA. SUPPREME COURT COMM.
FOR UNIF. CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 2016).
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the government has proved each of the following beyond a reason-
able doubt.”220 The most natural reading of this language is that the
finding based on the elements is permissive—that is, meeting the
burden of proof on each element is necessary but not sufficient to
find guilt. Entailment check instructions typically go on to state
that failure of the claimant to prove one element compels a finding
for the defendant221—a point that simply reiterates that proof of all
the elements is a necessary condition for the claimant to win. Some
do this as a general instruction, some do so with the specific claim
or charge, and some do both.222
The pattern we identify as “aggregate elements” consists of jury
instructions that break out the elements but use language suggest-
ing that the finding requires the elements to be viewed in the ag-
gregate. Although express whole claim language is absent from
these instructions, the aggregation language implies a whole claim
condition. For example, the Eighth Circuit defines the burden of
proof without reference to whole claims (“A fact has been proved ...
if you find that it is more likely true than not true.”223) and em-
ploys aggregation language to instruct on specific causes of action:
“Your verdict must be for plaintiff ... and against defendant ... on
plaintiff ’s claim ... if all the following elements have been proved.”224
Other examples of this pattern merely list elements without stating
whether the burden of proof applies to the elements individually or
as a whole. For example, Alaska’s negligence instruction states:
In order to find that the plaintiff is entitled to recover, you must
decide it is more likely true than not true that:
1. the defendant was negligent;
2. the plaintiff was harmed; and
220. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL CASES) § 2.19 (COMM. ON PATTERN JURY IN-
STRUCTIONS DIST. JUDGES ASS’N FIFTH CIRCUIT 2015).
221. See, e.g., ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CIVIL § 203 (“If ... you find from the
evidence that any of these propositions has not been proved, then your verdict should be for
(defendant).”).
222. See, e.g., PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL CASES) §§ 1.05, 2.19 (COMM. ON PAT-
TERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS DIST. JUDGES ASS’N FIFTH CIRCUIT 2015).
223. MANUAL OF MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE
EIGHTH CIRCUIT § 3.04 (COMM. ON MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
2017).
224. Id. § 5.40.
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3. t he defendant’s negligence was a substantial factor in caus-
ing the plaintiff ’s harm.225
We agree with Nance’s argument that these instructions can be read
as treating the “each element” condition as necessary but not suf-
ficient, though they are admittedly ambiguous.226 Those instructions
that direct a finding for the claimant when “all” the elements have
been proved can be read as directing their mandatory language—the
required finding—to the whole-claim condition.
The pattern we identify as “elements only—permissive” asks
jurors to apply the burden of proof to separate elements, but does so
without stating or implying that meeting the “each element”
condition requires a finding for the claimant. For example, New
Mexico instructs generally that the plaintiff “has the burden of
proving every essential element of the claim ... by the greater weight
of the evidence,”227 and simply lists the elements of specific sub-
stantive claims.228 At the same time, these instructions do not say
anything to override a “whole claim” condition.229 This is important
because story model research suggests that assumption 5—the
claimant must prove the whole claim to the relevant standard of
proof—is simply built into jurors’ reasoning, to the extent that only
an express contrary instruction could override it.230 Eight sets of
jury instructions—seven in civil cases and one in criminal cases—
follow this pattern.
These two patterns, “aggregate elements” and “elements only—
permissive,” do not merely avoid the conjunction problem. We be-
lieve they are consistent with the “entailment check” explanation,
because such instructions taken as a whole leave in place the tacit
understanding of a whole claim condition, while describing ele-
ments in terms that make them necessary but not sufficient
conditions. Such instructions formally allow jurors to consider
225. ALASKA CIVIL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 3.01 (CIVIL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
COMM. 2017).
226. See Nance, supra note 18, at 950-51.
227. NEW MEXICO UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CIVIL § 13-304 (UNIF. JURY INSTRUC-
TIONS—CIVIL COMM. 2017).
228. E.g., id. § 13-1114.
229. See id. §§ 13-304, 13-1114.
230. See Pennington & Hastie, supra note 7, at 527-28 (explaining that jurors probably
consider whole claims whether instructed to or not).
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individual elements for the purpose of ensuring that none fall below
the burden of proof, while basing their ultimate decision on the
probability of the whole claim. Nineteen sets of instructions (four-
teen civil, five criminal) fall into these two patterns.
The last pattern, which we have designated as “holistic,” com-
prises instructions that do not break claims down into elements to
be considered separately. Instead, the instructions identify causes
of action as a detailed definition rather than a list of elements. The
New York instruction on legal malpractice illustrates:
To establish CD’s liability for malpractice, AB must prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that, in representing AB in [state
matter in issue] CD failed to exercise that degree of care, skill
and diligence commonly exercised by a member of the legal pro-
fession .... In determining the degree of skill commonly used by
an ordinary member of the legal profession in CD’s situation,
you should consider all of the evidence you have heard .... Once
you have determined the degree of skill commonly used by an
ordinary member of the legal profession in CD’s situation, you
should go on to decide whether CD departed from that standard
.... AB has the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, that CD did not, in fact, exercise that degree of skill, care
and diligence commonly used by an ordinary member of the legal
profession in the situation.231
Holistic instructions can be understood to incorporate assumption
5 (the whole claim condition) while omitting assumption 4 (the each
element condition). Thus they cannot be explained as incorporating
the entailment check idea, since that assumes separate application
of the burden of proof to the elements individually. At the same
time, by focusing only on the whole claim condition, holistic instruc-
tions also avoid the conjunction problem.232 Eight sets of jury in-
structions (four civil, four criminal, for a total of 8.7%) follow this
pattern.
To summarize: The data from the ninety-two sets of jury instruc-
tions (forty-seven civil, forty-five criminal) across fifty-five state and
federal jurisdictions show that only twenty-six (28.3%) replicate the
231. NEW YORK PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CIVIL § 2:152 (COMM. ON PATTERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS ASS’N OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 2016).
232. See supra Part II.C.1 (explaining the holistic solution to the conjunction problem).
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conjunction paradox. A total of fifty-eight (63%) are consistent with
the entailment check explanation.
4. Special Verdict Forms
A general verdict is one that announces the guilt or liability result
for each charge or claim: “on the claim of negligence, we find for the
plaintiff ” or “on the charge of murder in the first degree, we find the
defendant guilty.”233 In contrast to the general verdict, a jury may
be asked to render a “special verdict,” which breaks down the over-
all liability finding into a series of components.234 This is accom-
plished by requiring the jury to answer a series of questions on a
written form, and the set of answers will dictate the ultimate ver-
dict.235 Typically, the questions on a special verdict form will track
the elements of the claim, though they might be presented as a
series of case-specific factual propositions. For example:
1. Was [name of defendant] negligent?
__ Yes __ No
If your answer to question 1 is yes, then answer question 2. If
you answered no, stop here, answer no further questions, and
have the presiding juror sign and date this form.
2. Was [name of defendant]’s negligence a substantial factor in
causing harm to [name of plaintiff]?
__ Yes __ No
If your answer to question 2 is yes, then answer question 3. If
you answered no, stop here, answer no further questions, and
have the presiding juror sign and date this form.
3. What are [name of plaintiff ]’s damages?236
While many special verdict forms are longer because they embrace
more than three elements,237 the above format is typical. In this
233. General Verdict, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
234. See FED. R. CIV. P. 49(a) (describing special verdicts).
235. See Special Verdict, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 233.
236. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS VF-400 (JUDICIAL
COUNCIL OF CAL. ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 2016).
237. See, e.g., id. at VF-401 (listing six elements on a special verdict form).
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format, the “no” answer indicates a failure to meet the burden of
proof on a given element, which results in a defense verdict. A plain-
tiff ’s verdict requires a series of “yes” answers.
As the above form suggests, the special verdict form seems to
imply that meeting the burden of proof on each element seriatim is
a sufficient condition to render a plaintiff ’s verdict. On this type of
form, jurors have no straightforward opportunity to answer “yes” to
the liability questions yet still find for the defendant. (They could
do so somewhat indirectly by entering zero money damages in some
cases.) Depending on how the form is written,238 and how juries use
the form to structure their inquiries, the special verdict form could
create an additional layer of ambiguity. If jurors follow their
instincts or instructions to decide the whole claim first, the special
verdict form could simply be used to retrofit findings on the ele-
ments. But it is also conceivable that judges and jurors construe
special verdict forms as imposing condition 4b, so that a finding on
“each element” directs the jury to find for the claimant.
D. Reconsidering the Conjunction Problem: Theory Meets Practice
We are tempted to say that there really is no conjunction problem.
On the surface, the problem is easily fixed by dropping assumption
4b: that is, by instructing juries that the overall claim must be
proved to the probability threshold, and that proving each element
to that threshold is a necessary condition, while refraining from
stating that it is a sufficient condition. To the extent that the prob-
ability gap troubles theorists, we are not uncomfortable in dismiss-
ing that concern as a math or perception mistake. But that’s all in
theory.
In practice, matters are more complicated. On the one hand, most
jurisdictions give instructions that apply the burden of proof to
whole claims,239 and either omit reference to elements240 or else refer
238. The Federal Rules imply that a general verdict form can ask a series of underlying
factual questions and yet generate a general verdict that is “inconsistent” with those answers.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 49(b)(3). This illustrates that a verdict form can be written to embody both
conditions 4a and 5.
239. See supra Table 1.
240. See, e.g., CONNECTICUT JUDICIAL BRANCH CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 3.2-1 (CIVIL JURY
INSTRUCTION COMM. 2008).
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to them in ways consistent with the entailment check explanation.241
These jurisdictions, therefore, do not reproduce the conjunction
problem. By our tally, this accounts for sixty-six out of the ninety-
two sets of pattern jury instructions we analyzed (72%). On the
other hand, the number of jurisdictions whose instructions repro-
duce the conjunction problem is not trivial. And the use of special
verdict forms adds to this ambiguity, because they can be under-
stood to mandate a win for the plaintiff based on the probability of
elements rather than the whole claim. It is not certain how wide-
spread the use of special verdicts actually is.242
Moreover, we find it noteworthy that the conjunction problem is
more prevalent in criminal instructions. The jurisdictions we stud-
ied are 42% more likely to require juries to convict in criminal cases
based on meeting an “each element” condition (assumption 4b) than
they are to impose the analogous “each element” requirement on
civil juries.243 What to make of this is unclear. The multiplication
rule for conjunctions—even assuming dependence of the elements—
suggests, in theory, that “each element” instructions tend to favor
the claimant.244 It might thus be the case that many jurisdictions
are adding a thumb to the scale on the side of the prosecution in
criminal cases. The question is certainly worth further study.
We hesitate to draw any real-world conclusions about how legal
practice should be changed relative to probability issues. Yet two
conclusions are very clear. First, many evidence theorists have ap-
proached the conjunction problem from the wrong direction: as a
theoretical problem whose solution requires a major theoretical shift
with potential implications for legal practice.245 As argued above,
241. See, e.g., ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CIVIL § 203 (ARK. SUPREME COURT
COMM. ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CIVIL 2016).
242. Special verdicts are virtually never used in criminal cases, and their use in civil cases
is far from universal. See 9B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 37, § 2505 (noting that use of
special verdict forms has not been established through empirical study and explaining that
“[r]egardless of how advantageous the use of the special verdict may be, the use of Rule 49(a)
never has been widespread in the federal courts”); Anne Bowen Poulin, The Jury: The
Criminal Justice System’s Different Voice, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1377, 1420 (1994) (noting the
rarity of special verdict forms in criminal cases).
243. Numerically, fifteen out of forty-five jurisdictions implement assumption 4b in their
criminal instructions (33.3%), compared to only eleven out of forty-seven jurisdictions doing
so in their civil instructions (23.4%). See supra Table 1.
244. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (explaining the multiplication rule).
245. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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the theoretical proposals to change or omit the rules of probability,
or to drop the assumption that a claimant must prove his overall
claim to the applicable probability threshold, could require signifi-
cant changes in how we think about the litigation system and how
that system currently operates.246 Attaining theoretical consistency
can produce unintended and undesirable practical consequences.
Second, and related, the conjunction problem should be under-
stood and studied from an empirical vantage point. Many evidence
scholars, even those whom we think are overly concerned with the
theoretical impact of the conjunction problem, seem to agree that
jurors will tend to decide cases holistically, based on their level of
belief in the claim as a whole, if not instructed otherwise.247 Indeed,
many believe that juries will decide cases based on the “whole
claim” condition no matter what the jury instructions or special
verdict forms say. Jurors’ answers to questions about the degree of
proof of specific elements may thus be simply backed out of the
product. That is to say, as far as the legal system is concerned, if the
jury finds civil liability 51% true, or criminal guilt 91% true, the
probabilities of the elements can be retrofitted to make the math
come out right.
If that is true, then the conjunction problem does not exist in
practice, and we can satisfy ourselves (for better or worse) with our
explanation in this Article that it does not create a significant prob-
lem in theory. Certainly it does not create a theoretical problem that
provides a good reason for banning probability theory as an ana-
lytical tool in understanding adjudicative fact-finding.
But empirical studies might suggest that there is a conjunction
problem after all. For example, prosecutors’ extremely high rate of
convictions in criminal trials might not be the result of a desirable
selection effect—that prosecutors use their discretion to try only the
strongest cases.248 It could also result in part from a tendency of
jurors to convict based on the probabilities of elements alone with-
out considering the probability of the whole claim—or from the
tendency in many jurisdictions to instruct jurors to do so. The fact
246. See supra Part II (describing the problems that may result from evidence theorists’
high-level theoretical approaches to solving the conjunction problem).
247. See supra Part II.C.1 (explaining some scholars’ theories that jurors decide cases
holistically).
248. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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that different instructions are used in different jurisdictions—some
directing a guilty verdict based on elements,249 others based on
whole claims250—suggests the possibility for a natural empirical
experiment. Similar experiments could be constructed in civil cases.
It’s also possible that the effects of “each element” instructions on
juries may turn out to have empirical results that work well in prac-
tice despite seeming perverse from a purely probabilistic vantage
point. Viewed purely as a math problem, an instruction or special
verdict form indicating that the plaintiff wins if each element is
proven to the probability threshold should work to the advantage of
plaintiffs, if the probability of the whole claim is disregarded. But
suppose that empirical and policy research were to conclude that
juries too often reach defense verdicts in civil cases. After all, story
model research suggests that juries do not disregard whole claim
probabilities.251 In such a context, the use of a special verdict form
might offset a thumb on the scale of civil defendants. On the other
hand, plaintiffs’ lawyers frequently argue that complex, multi-
element verdict forms favor the defense, because they tend to
confuse jurors.252 If this is true, then probability theory and real-
world behavior would point toward contrary solutions.
The logic of our argument would suggest that a theoretical con-
junction problem could be cleared up by eliminating special verdict
forms and having all jurisdictions adopt a model in which juries are
instructed to decide whole claims and “check” for the probable pres-
ence of each element. Yet this logic is hardly sufficient to suggest
actually making such a change to jury instructions without ade-
quate knowledge of what consequences would be brought about by
such a change. Perhaps the intuition is right, that plaintiffs have a
hard enough time proving each element without requiring proof of
249. See, e.g., NEW MEXICO UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CIVIL § 13-304 (UNIF. JURY
INSTRUCTIONS—CIVIL COMM. 2017) (party seeking recovery must “prov[e] every essential
element of the claim”).
250. See, e.g., PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL CASES) § 3.2 (COMM. ON PATTERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS DIST. JUDGES ASS’N FIFTH CIRCUIT 2016) (“Plaintiff ... has the burden of proving
[his/her/its] case”).
251. See Pennington & Hastie, supra note 7, at 527-28.
252. See Thornburg, supra note 27, at 1886-88 (citing research suggesting that special
verdict forms can work against plaintiffs). But see Spottswood, supra note 6, at 267 & n.36
(citing arguments from judges that special verdict forms offset a tendency of jurors to tilt
holistic decision-making against plaintiffs).
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the whole claim—we simply don’t know. Theorists of any stripe
should proceed with caution and modesty when it comes to extend-
ing theoretical insights to proposals for legal reform.253
CONCLUSION
The conjunction problem is discussed in evidence literature as a
component of a larger debate about the role of probability theory in
adjudicative fact-finding. We have argued that the conjunction prob-
lem is exaggerated, if not illusory, as a theoretical matter. It seems
to be based in part on a mathematically wrong intuition: that it is
somehow improper to require that elements be proven to a higher
level of certainty than whole claims. This error is made worse by the
erroneous application of the multiplication rule for independent
events.254 And the conjunction problem is based formally on the
legally questionable assumption that fact-finders are required to
find for claimants who prove only that the elements of their claims
exceed the applicable burden-of-proof probability threshold. In the
language of most jury instructions, such proof of elements is a
necessary but not sufficient condition to find for the claimant. If the
applicable burden of proof applies to the overall claim, and jurors
are not expressly directed to find for claimants who have proven
each separate element, the jury instructions ask for an “entailment
check.” That is, they can be understood to single out elements
simply to make sure that those are included in the claimant’s more
detailed factual narrative, and to remind the jury that failure of
proof on one element entails rejection of the entire claim.
Our argument diminishing the conjunction problem removes a
source of confusion from the larger theoretical debate about the role
of probability theory in the adjudication system. Whatever grounds
there are to “believe that adjudicative fact-finding is fundamentally
incompatible with mathematical probability,”255 those grounds
should not include the perceived need to “solve”—or even avoid—the
conjunction problem. We might go a step further and suggest that
253. For this reason, we disagree with—or at least, we find premature—Spottswood’s
conclusion that jury instructions should be changed to conform to probability theory. See
Spottswood, supra note 6, at 292-96.
254. See supra Part III.
255. Allen & Stein, supra note 1, at 562.
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the existence of paradoxes does not necessarily entail the total
rejection of probability theory. For example, the “Blue Bus”256 and
“Gatecrasher”257 paradoxes both tell us, not that probability theory
is anomalous, but that naked statistical evidence—and perhaps
purely probabilistic analysis—may be an incomplete basis for under-
standing how the concept of justified belief should work in the litiga-
tion system. There is a difference between using probability theory
as an illustrative or analytical tool and using probability theory as
a sufficient basis for determining what the fact-finder should be-
lieve.
256. See supra note 25 (discussing the “Blue Bus” paradox).
257. See Allen & Stein, supra note 1, at 573-74 (summarizing the “Gatecrasher” paradox).
